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I. Introduction
Recently, the conservative1 majority of the Supreme Court forwarded its vision
of the proper role of courts in two cases, namely Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation'
and Air Courier Conference of America v. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO.' Both deal
with access to the judiciary for review of agency action. The National Wildlife
Federation decision has aroused the greatest furor,4 and has already borne fruit with
the decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders of Wildlife).5 Nevertheless, the
Air Courier decision maybe a "sleeper" of a case, one which will have more ultimate
impact on who may invoke judicial review.
The two cases, together with Defenders of Wildlife, tighten access to the judiciary,
making it harder for parties other than those directly regulated by an agency to
challenge the agency's action. When this constriction is combined with other
Supreme Court precedents, a mirror image of the nondelegation doctrine emerges.
As with the original doctrine, Congress's ability to legislate through general policy
guidance is questioned, but the vehicle of disapproval in this incarnation is with-
drawal of judicial review.
In both National Wildlife Federation and Air Courier, the impact on judicial access
came from pronouncements that were not necessary to resolve the controversy.6
Similarly, four Justices in Defenders of Wildlife provided a second rationale to deny
standing when one would have sufficed.7 One reason the Court digresses is because
regulating entry to courts is as important to the current conservative agenda as
it was to the more liberal agenda of prior courts.8 Recognizing echoes of earlier
1. Although the labels conservative and liberal have numerous connotations, for the purposes of
this article, "liberal" refers to those in favor of wide access to thejudiciary, and "conservative" refers
to those who would limit such access. To a certain extent, this dichotomy will correlvte with those
who espouse "liberal" and "conservative" philosophies as popularly delineated. The majority for
tightening access began to break ranks in Defenders of Wildlife. See infra note 76.
2. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990)..
3. 111 S. Ct. 913 (1991).
4. See, e.g. Karin Sheldon, NWF v. Lujan: JusticeScalia Restricts Environmental Standing to Constrain
the Courts, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10557, 10560-61 (1990); Poisner, Environmental Values and Judicial Review
afterLujan: Two Critiques ofthe Separation ofPowers Theory ofStanding, 18 EcOL. L. Q. 335(1991);
Note John Treangen, Standing: Closing the Doors ofJudicial Review: Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
36 S.D. L. REv. 136, 138-45 (1991); Note Bradley J. Larsen, Meeting the Requirements of Standing: A
Framework for Environmental Interest Groups: Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990),
14 HAMLINE L. REV. 277, 284-85 (1990); Bill J. Hays, Comment, Standing and Environmental Law:
judicial Policy and the Impact ofLujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 997 (1991);
Note Michael J. Shinn, Misusing Procedural Devices to Dismiss an Environmental Lawsuit-Luian v. National
Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), 66 WASH. L. REV. 893 (1991); and Tae P. Ho, Note, Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation: Non-User Plaintiffs and the Standing Requirement of Injury in Fact in
Environmental Litigation, 5 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 99 (1990).
5. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
6. See generally, Marla E. Mansfield, Standing and Ripeness Revisited: The Supreme Court's "Hypotheti-
cal" Barriers, 68 N.D. L. REV. 1 (1992).
7. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2140-42 (Scalia, J. joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, and
Thomas, JJ.) (lack of redressability forecloses standing).
8. The Supreme Court has discussed standing when not argued by the parties. FW/PBS, Inc.
v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596, 607-08 (1990). Cf., Michael A. Peroni, Comment, Justice Scalia:
Standing, Environmental, Law and the Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 135, 157, n. 173 (1987)
(Scalia wrote 18 opinions on standing in 4 years on the D.C. Court of Appeals).
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philosophies, therefore, explicates the cases. Their unde pinnings are found not
only in a separation of powers analysis, but the cases also raise the specters of
sovereign immunity and the nondelegation doctrine.
The direct holding of Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, however, does not
immediately reveal these pedigrees. It does not change tcaditional standing doc-
trine nor create too onerous a barrier to judicial access. National Wildlife Federation
only directly requires that the plaintiff be specific whe i expressing use of the
particular land the agency action would affect. This would enable the plaintiff to
be counted among those with an "injury in fact" and therefore entitled to stand-
ing.9 The majority opinion, however, contains two additional propositions: a
general "program" is not an "action" subject to appeal" and court intervention
might not be "ripe" until actual earth-moving activity beg ins on the public lands."
These ruminations can hamstring plaintiffs who want early and system-wide relief
from illegal agency actions. Congressionally granted pro)tection may be eroded
because of Justice Scalia's "abstract" discussion in National Wildlife Federation.
Similarly, Air Courier Conference of America v. Postal Workes Union, AFL-CIO could
have been a narrow decision with no general impact on standing law."2 Nevertheless,
the majority denied standing under the so-called zone-of-ir terest test, 3 a prudential
limitation on standing. The test demands a particular type c f connection between the
plaintiff's injury and the "relevant statute." 14 Strict applicat on of the zone-of-interest
test can limit access to courts, a phenomenon that changes t le nature of the test from
one previously described as "not . . . especially demanding." 5 It heralds a return
to the concept that only direct beneficiaries of a statute may enter the courts.
Air Courier, National Wildlife Federation, and Defenders of Wildlife culminate a trend
within the Court that embodies conservative beliefs that ijudge should not freely
"make law" but should allow the politically accountable 1egislature and executive
to handle majoritarian interests.' 6 Closing the door to judicial review, however,
can increase the executive's power. This power rearrangement is underscored
9. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3190-91.
12. The dissent noted that the Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to the statute under
which the challenge was brought and the action was therefore unreviewable. Air Courier, 111 S. Ct.
at 921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 918-20.
14. The test arose as a gloss on the Administrative Procedure Act's grant of standing to those
"suffering legal wrong ... or adversely affected or aggrieved . . . wit iin the meaning of a relevant
statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). See infra text and authorities at note.; 227-31.
15. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). Ju' tice White wrote this opinion,
which aligns it with liberal tendencies. He was among those who merely concurred in the original case
imposing the "zone-of-interest test." At that point, Justice White assert d that "injury in fact" should
have been sufficient to confer standing and the "zone" test unnecesse rily tightened judicial access.
Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 167 (1970) (Brennan and
White, JJ., concurring in the result). Interestingly, those who merely concurred with the judgment
in Clarke, which contained this easily met depiction, did so because th y thought that the case could
have been resolved by simple use of precedents. Therefore, they labelted the Court's comments on
the liberality of the test "a wholly unnecessary exegesis on the zone-of-ir.terest' test." Clarke, 479 U.S.
at 410. (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.)
16. See text and authorities cited, infra notes 201-212.
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when access limits are combined with the standard of review of agency action as
stated in the 1984 opinion of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. " Chevron's requirement of deference to agency views, when added to limited
standing and strict ripeness rules, makes courts less available to ascertain the
intended meaning of a statute. The remedy for an agency misinterpretation of the
law, therefore, is to go to Congress to change it. Deference and limited standing
in combination create a mirror-image of the nondelegation doctrine.
In this version of the nondelegation doctrine, statutes are not invalidated as
standardless, but Congress is being forced to be specific in legislating because
judges will not be available to ascertain whether agency interpretations comport
with generalized intent. Although requiring congressional remedies for agency
errors might not be objectionable in the abstract, in reality Congress cannot
micro-manage all regulatory programs. The judiciary is as necessary a "check
and balance" on the executive as it is on the Congress. To limit access to the
judiciary can realign powers between Congress and the Executive as well as change
the judicial role.
To fully understand this proposition, this article will first review National
Wildlife Federation and Air Courier in detail. Defenders of Wildlife will similarly be
reviewed. With the cases explicated, Section III reveals that the current tight-
ening returns to an older private rights model of standing, which concentrates
on the individualistic sphere rather than public law. The article then examines
and critiques the philosophical underpinnings and judicial precursors of this
"new" old law. Section IV concentrates on National Wildlife Federation and the
separation of powers arguments for decreased access to the judiciary. It identifies
Justice Scalia's reliance on the wording of the Administrative Procedures Act
as a refinement of separation of powers argument. The article next turns to
the Air Courier decision and its restructuring of the "zone-of-interest" test to
ascertain its impact on whether beneficiaries of statutes will be granted standing
or be dismissed as mere "bystanders." Finally, Section VI moves from the
traditional realm of standing and ripeness discussions to recognize that the
current state of affairs echoes the doctrine of sovereign immunity and creates
a new version of the nondelegation doctrine.
II. The Cases: National Wildlife Federation, Air Courier Conference
and Defenders of Wildlife
A. LUJAN v. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION
1. Overview
National Wildlife Federation creates two requirements for potential plaintiffs, both
designed to limit court intervention to situations that threaten individual rights.
17. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The
so-called Chevron doctrine requires that, if a statute is ambiguous, an agency policy should be upheld
if it is "reasonable," regardless of whether or not either the judge or a legislator might believe it is
the best or most appropriate interpretation of the law.
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First, the case insists that an injury be pled with specificity. Second, National
Wildlife Federation shies away from allowing challenges to p eneral regulatory actions
in favor of requiring a plaintiff to await concrete harm before seeking redress. This
implicates ripeness doctrine as well as standing. 8 The Rational Wildlife Federation
case arose when suit was filed in July of 1985.19
During the early 1980s, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) was actively
terminating land classifications and revoking withdrawah: when it felt these admin-
istrative orders no longer served their original purpose!:. Before modification of
the orders, the lands affected by them were unavailable fhr the full array of public
land laws.2 ° The Federation alleged that the program under which the BLM acted
had two faults: the BLM did not evaluate the environmental impacts of its actions
adequately and did not provide sufficient public participation in the decisionmak-
ing process. The case on the merits has never been compli:ted, but for several years
the BLM was under a preliminary injunction.
In late 1985, Judge Pratt found the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits.21
The preliminary injunction he entered required the lands tc be returned to their status
as ofJanuary 1, 1981. 22 Judge Pratt's action was upheld on appeal, 23 but almost three
years later, Judge Pratt found that the plaintiffs lacked stani ling to bring the lawsuit.
24
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, both as a ni:w issue and as part of the
"law of the case." 25 The Department of Interior sought -ertiorari.
In its petition, the government framed the question in terms of standing to
obtain system-wide relief:
Whether, in a lawsuit challenging a vast array of governmert decisions affecting the use
or disposition of approximately 180,000,000 acres of public land, an environmental
organization may establish its standing to sue on an affidavi: asserting that one member
of the organization makes use of property "in the vicinity of" a particular 2,000,000
acre parcel, only 4,500 acres of which were affected by one of the challenged decisions.
26
18, "Standing" deals with the "who" of a lawsuit; "ripeness" deals with the "when." Since the
1967 Abbott Laboratories decision, determining whether an action is ri]e for judicial review generally
requires two inquiries: the evaluation of "both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Abbott Lobs, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 148-49 (1967). See generally, Mansfield, supra note 6 at 19-23, 68-70; Gene R. NicholJr., Ripeness
and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 155 (1987); and Brian . Murchison, On Ripeness and
Pragmatism' in Administrative Law. 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 168 (1989).
19. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D C. 1985).
20. For background on the withdrawal and classification laws, ::ee National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 307-09 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(National Wildlife Federation 1).
21. For land classification terminations, the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that
the BLM improperly terminated them without Resource Managemett Plans. National Wildlife Fed'n,
676 F. Supp. at 277. For withdrawal revocations, they were likely tc succeed because there was no
public participation as required by FLPMA for land management a :tivities. Id. at 278.
22. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985), explicated, National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1986) (Feb. 10, 1986).
23. National Wildlife Federation I, 835 F.2d 305.
24. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D C. 1988) (Nov. 4, 1988).
25. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 430, 432-33 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (National
Wildlife Federation I1). Different judges heard the case in each appeal. Th - second decision was character-
ized as being rendered "somewhat testily." Sheldon, supra note 4, at 10561.
26. U.S. Dept. of Interior, Petition for Certiorari, NWF V. Lujaa, No. 89-640 (Oct. 18, 1989).
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The challenge was sent. As the Supreme Court phrased the issues, the APA
governed the case. 27 Therefore, the question was two-fold: (1) whether there was
a "final agency action" subject to review; 28 and (2) whether there was a party
"suffering legal wrong or adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of
the relevant statute. - '  The first issue, with its concern for "finality" and an
identifiable "action" corresponds to some degree with ripeness doctrine.30 The
second issue concerns the traditional standing inquiry and will be addressed first.
2. The "Injury in Fact" Decision
In order to have standing, a plaintiff must allege an injury in fact and be among
the injured.31 The National Wildlife Federation claimed an injury to the environmental
and aesthetic interests of its members.32 Because these types of injuries are cognizable,
the primary issue in the case was whether Federation members were "among the
injured." A second question involved the scope of the action challenged.
The Federation sought to contest what it referred to as the "Land Withdrawal
Review Program,' 33 which was a policy encompassed in several agency direc-
tives.34 By the time of suit, at least 788 classifications had been terminated or
withdrawals revoked.35 Each of these actions was done by a Public Land Order
(PLO) or other notice published in the Federal Register.36 The Federation concen-
trated on two particular localities in order to attack the program. These were the
South Pass-Green Mountain area in Wyoming and the Grand Canyon National
Park-Arizona Strip area. The Federation filed affidavits of two members that
stated that the member used land "in the vicinity" of one of these locales.37
27. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3185. (APA rules because neither NEA nor FLPMA
provide a private right of action.)
28. Id. See also 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (review of final agency action made reviewable by statute
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in court) and discussion of APA,
infra at notes 167-73.
29. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3185. See also 5 U.S.C. § 702.
30. It is also, to some degree, reminiscent of the Supreme Court's insistence on a concrete "pro-
posal" to trigger NEPA. CompareKleppe v. SierraClub, 427 U.S. 390, 401 (1976) with National Wildlife
Fed'n, 110 S. Ct at 3190 (desire to "flesh out controversy").
31. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 729, 735 (1972). This criterion has been called the core constitu-
tional component of standing. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has enumerated prudential limitations on standing, which Congress may eliminate by legisla-
tively granting standing. Bread Political Action Comm'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577,
584 (1981). Standing will be denied prudentially if the injury is a generalized grievance, if the plaintiff
is asserting the rights of third parties, or if the injury is not within the "zone of interest" of the "relevant
statute." Valley Forge Christian College v. American United for Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982). For a fuller discussion, see Mansfield, supra note 6.
32. National Wildlife Federation I, 835 F.2d at 312-13. It also alleged that it was injured as an
organization because the BLM's failure to provide information and public participation interfered
with the Federation's purposes, which include participating in decisionmaking. National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 330 (D.D.C. 1988) (Nov. 4, 1988).
33. National Wildlife Federation I, 835 F.2d at 309.
34. See, e.g., BLM Organic Act Directive No. 81-11, June 18, 1981; for more detail, see Treangen,
supra note 4, at 157-58 and Larsen, supra note 4, at 284-85.
35. National Wildlife Federation I, 835 F.2d at 312.
36. Id. at 307-09.
37. Referred to as the Erman and Peterson affidavits; see, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford,
699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D.D.C. 1988).
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The Court of Appeals in 1987 was the first court tc use these affidavits in
analyzing whether an injury in fact was shown.38 The cou rt expressly rejected the
idea that standingwould be negated by employment of the words "in the vicinity"
in reference to the lands covered by the challenged w:thdrawal revocations."
Moreover, the court was unconcerned about the "fairly traceable" and "re-
dressability" requirements of standing. 40 Injury was not dependent on additional
actions by third parties because the agency action direci ly impacted lands.4'
WhenJudge Pratt looked at these affidavits in response :o a motion for summary
judgment, he disagreed with this assessment of the injury and focused on one
question: "whether the plaintiff's. . .[use of lands] will occur in the same location
as the third party's response to the challenged governmental action." 42 Whether
activities no longer forbidden might take place and thus interfere with the mem-
bers' enjoyment of public lands was of primary concern. lI-e seemingly treated the
injury as incomplete without something in addition to thc governmental action of
opening lands.43
Judge Pratt therefore examined the affidavits carefull). 44 He rejected standing
based on injury to specific members. To him, the proof was inadequate not only for
the individual actions mentioned in the affidavits, but also for the entire program:
Both the Peterson and Erman Affidavits are vague, conclusocy and lack factual specific-
ity. They do not and cannot show 'injury in fact' with resp ct to the two specific areas
38. National Wildlife Federation I, 835 F.2d at 313. Before addressing the affidavits, however, it
noted that the allegations of the complaint alone would suffice to deny a i notion to dismiss under United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRI P), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). The
complaint referred to specific land by reference to identified actions published in the Federal Register
and therefore alleged use of affected lands. National Wildlife Federation I, 835 F.2d at 312-13.
39. National Wildlife Federation 1, 835 F.2d at 313. Compare language in National Wildlife Fed'n dealing
with use of lands "in the vicinity" with allegations in SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 678.
40. Two refinements theoretically clarify the injury in fact requ rement. First, the questioned
agency action must have caused the injury. Moreover, the relief request d must be capable of redressing
the complained of injury. The first of these elements is the "causation" or "fairly traceable" require-
ment and the second is the "redressability" requirement. Allen, 468 U.S. at 753, n.19. See also infra
note 43 and Mansfield, supra note 6 at 11-15.
41. National Wildlife Federation I, 835 F.2d at 314. ("Because the [Withdrawal Review] Program
acts directly on the land (rather than on third parties), we can be certoin that the challenged agency
action has affected the land areas that the Federation's members use ar d that the anticipated response
by third parties will concern those lands.")
42. National Wildlife Fed'n, 699 F. Supp. at 331 (quoting Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4,
12 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Griles dealt with the difficulty of proving use of submerged lands.
43. He is therefore echoing the times that the Supreme Court applied an extra level of analysis
when activities of third parties in response to agency policies would act ially be required for a concrete
remedy. If no one could predict whether these third party actions would assist the plaintiffs, standing
could be denied because a favorable ruling would not redress the harm. Allen, 468 U.S. at 758. See
generally Richard H. Fallon, OfJusticiability, Remedies, and Public Law Lii igation: Notes on theJurisprudence
of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35-39 (1984) (addressing problem in terms of "remedial standing").
44. The Peterson Affidavit claimed that she used land "in the vic nity" of the South Pass-Green
Mountain area. The court noted the largeness of the area and relatively localized impacts of opening
the lands to mineral activity. The classification termination would all:w mining on 4,500 acres, but
the relevant area comprised two million acres, the balance of which, cx :ept for 2,000 acres, had always
been open to mineral leasing and mining. National Wildlife Fed'n, 69!I F. Supp. at 331. The Erman
Affidavit similarly referred to using federal lands in the vicinity of the affected public lands, which in
the Grand Canyon-Arizona Strip area comprised more than 5.5 mil.ion acres. Id. at 332.
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in Wyoming and Arizona in the vicinity of which these affiants claim to be located. More
important, standing alone, these two affidavits do not provide any basis for standing to
challenge, as violative of the Federal Land Policy Management Act, the legality of each
of the 1250 or so individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations.45
No injury in fact existed for the members. 46
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that the affidavits did show "injury in fact."
Its decision was partially based on the law of the case. 47 However, the court also
insisted that the affidavits be read as sufficiently "specific" because to not do so
would make them meaningless. 48 At a minimum, the affidavits should be consid-
ered "ambiguous" and doubts resolved in favor of the non-moving party, that is,
the Federation.49
The Supreme Court looked at the same affidavits to ascertain if"injury in fact"
was shown. It easily found that the type of injury alleged, namely environmental
and aesthetic harm, could be cognizable, but questioned whether the affidavits
demonstrated that such interests of the two members were affected.50 Under its
reading, they did not prove such injury: the "averments. . . state only that one
of respondent's members uses unspecified portions of an immense tract of terri-
tory, on some portions of which mining activity has occurred or probably will
occur by virtue of the governmental action.""' The affidavits did not aver any
specific facts and a court could not "presume" facts necessary for standing.5"
To the Court, the affidavits of individual members proved no injury in fact to
challenge anything, be it a single PLO or a complete "Land Withdrawal Review
Program." 53 Justice Scalia found the affidavit in support of organizational stand-
45. Id. at 332.
46. He also found the affidavit of the vice president of the Federation submitted to support
organizational standing to be similarly "conclusory." Id. at 330.
47. See National Wildlife Federation, 878 F.2d at 432-33, where the second panel discussed the earlier
ruling on the sufficiency of the affidavits. The second panel acknowledged that the previous setting
involved a motion to dismiss, which has a lower burden for plaintiffs than summary judgment, but
recognized the prior judgment also found the injury sufficient for a preliminary injunction, which
requires a standard similar to that needed to sustain standing on a summary judgment motion. See
also National Wildlife Federation I, 835 F.2d at 329-30 (Williams, J., concurring & dissenting) (standing
to support preliminary injunction similar to that for summary judgment and "minimally met").
48. The affidavits were only challenged for their specificity, not their truthfulness:
If Peterson was not referring to lands in this 4500-acre affected area, her allegation of impairment
to her use and enjoyment would be meaningless, or perjurious.
Id. at 431.
49. Id. The Court of Appeals also felt that the District Court should consider the supplemental
affidavits submitted by the Sierra Club, which were without question sufficiently specific.
50. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3187. In this portion of the decision, the Supreme Court
emphasized the procedural status of the case. This was not a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, but a
summary judgment proceeding. Although doubts must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party
in this setting, Justice Scalia found the Court of Appeals inappropriately relied on this doctrine. The
decisional rule is applicable only when there is a conflict between averred facts. Id. at 3188 (only applies
"where the facts specifically averred by that party contradict facts specifically averred by the movant").
51. Id. at 3189.
52. Id. at 3189 ("It will not do not to 'presume' the missing facts because without them the
affidavits would not establish the injury that they generally allege.").
53. For an argument that the Court misinterpreted the "in the vicinity language," see Treangen,
supra note 4, at 153-55 (words used to avoid implication that plaintiffs were at the bottom of a pass
or top of a mountain).
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ing similarly flawed.54 To solve these problems, however, would only require
more specificity in pleading and recruitment of members who actually used the
particularly affected lands.
3. The Nature of an "Action" and the "Ripeness" Decision
Justice Scalia, however, additionally discussed what ccnstituted agency action
and what issues would be "ripe" to challenge." There are iwo distinct and separate
concepts important to this portion of the decision: (1) the Federation attacked the
BLM's "Land Withdrawal Review Program," and, to do so, (2) it detailed
certain Public Land Orders and classification orders to which it objected. These
particular orders had been modified to allow mineral ac:ivity on affected lands.
According to the Federation, this authorization would inju ire its members. Justice
Scalia questioned whether the operative element of the first concept, the so-called
program, was a "final agency action" and whether the actions delineated in the
second were "ripe" for review.
The first issue is the scope of the challenged action. To the Court of Appeals,
the lawsuit involved the total Land Withdrawal Review Program. It affirmed a
preliminary injunction that undid every individual BLM action taken since 1981
under the existent policy. Because the Federation challenged "an alleged pattern
of agency action," 56 the Court did not require it to prov. "injury" in regard to
each specific tract of land:
If the organization can establish that the Department's actions as to one parcel of land
are unlawful because the procedure by which the agency tenninates classifications and
revokes withdrawals fails to comply with FLPMA, then it has established the illegality
as to all the lands at issue which have been affected by the inlawful procedure.57
The common theme in each action would justify system-wide relief.
The Court of Appeals also resolved the second issue in favor of the plaintiffs. It
recognized an immediate impact from the BLM revocatior s and terminations. The
BLM was not merely authorizing third party activities that may impact the lands.
To the Court, the BLM actions revoking withdrawals an I terminating classifica-
54. In fact, it was worse in Justice Scalia's estimation because, ur like the Erman and Peterson
affidavits, the affidavit of the Federation's president did not contain geographical descriptions sufficient
to even identify a particular classification decision as the source of the problem. National Wildlife Fed'n,
110 S. Ct. at 3194.
55. Ostensibly, these issues had to be addressed because other submitted affidavits were more
specific than the rejected ones. See id. at 3189. In fact, the government admitted these supplemental
affidavits were not facially deficient although it reserved the right to attack the truth of their allegations.
Id. at 3196 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, however, hdd that the District Court did
not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit these affidavits. Id. at 3192-93. Justice Blackmun
therefore correctly labelled this portion of the majority opinion as "atbstract" because the majority
removed the predicate of needing to rule on the supplemental affidavits. Additionally, much of the
discussion could be described as going to the scope of relief, not the qu,!stion of standing. Id. at 3201
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. National Wildlife Federation 1, 835 F.2d at 314.
57. Id. See also National Wildlife Federation H, 878 F.2d at 431 n.12
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tions directly affected lands.5" Moreover, these program activities could create ir-
reparable injury for the plaintiffs.5 9 Changes in land ownership could occur.60 Addi-
tionally, mineral development might be imminent.6' To the Court of Appeals, it
was immaterial that the BLM retained discretion on whether or not it would allow
some future uses; the suit was developed to limit such discretion until the proper
procedures had been followed.62 Therefore, the Court in essence found that both the
program and the individual orders were sufficiently "ripe" for review.
Justice Scalia could not characterize the lawsuit in this manner. He refused to
acknowledge the "land withdrawal review program" was either an "agency ac-
tion" or "final agency action" subject to review:
The term "land withdrawal review program" (which as far as we know is not derived
from any authoritative text) does not refer to a single BLM order or regulation, or even
to a completed universe of particular BLM orders and regulations. It is simply the name
by which [the BLM has] occasionally referred to the continuing (and thus constantly
changing) operations of the BLM in reviewing withdrawal revocation applications and
the classifications of public lands and developing land use plans as required by the
FLPMA.63
According to Justice Scalia, generic agency activity cannot be reviewed without
identifying a particular regulation or order that has across-the-board applicabil-
ity.64 If one is identified, then a finding of illegality in one instance may impact
the "whole program." To a certain degree, Justice Scalia's argument is a matter
of semantics because the same end result is possible as under the Court of Appeals
reading.65
Nevertheless, there is a substantive difference between the approach of the Court
of Appeals and Justice Scalia. Most obviously, the Court of Appeals recognized
58. National Wildlife Federation 1, 835 F.2d at 314 ("[Biecause the Program acts directly on the land
(rather than on third parties), we can be certain that the challenged agency action has affected the land
areas that the Federation's members use .
59. Id. at 324-26.
60. Either from patenting under the Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 29 (1988), or through land
sales and exchanges, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1713, 1716 (1988).
61. 835 F.2d at 324-25. Under the Mining Law of 1872, mining could begin without government
approval. The opening of the lands for mineral leasing could also create immediate impacts. Seven
thousand mining claims had been located and 1,000 mineral leases issued on lands previously closed
to mining or mineral leasing. Id.
62. See id. at 325. The prior status in most instances ensured the lands withdrawn or classified
would remain in federal ownership. Id. at 324-25.
63. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
64. The Court explained:
If there is in fact some specific order or regulation, applying some particular measure across-the-
board to all individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations, and if that order or
regulation is final, and has become ripe for review in the manner we discuss subsequently in text,
it can of course be challenged under the APA by a person adversely affected-and the entire land
withdrawal review program,' insofar as the content of that particular action is concerned, would
thereby be affected.
Id. at 3190 n.2.
65. Justice Scalia, however, insists on the distinction, maintaining that to recognize a lawsuit's
general impact differs from "permitting a generic challenge to all aspects of the 'land withdrawal
review program,' as though that itself constituted a final agency action." Id.
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a "pattern of conduct" as being a sufficient "across-the-board" requirement to
trigger review. 66 No specifically designated "regulation" or "order" was neces-
sary to comprise an "action" in its view. More importantly, Justice Scalia main-
tains that even if a regulation is found to exist, which would satisfy the agency
action prerequisite, ripeness considerations may defer review unless a statute
specifically calls for review of broad regulations.67 To him, judicial review must
await until a concrete action is taken that would apply th( regulation in a manner
that would harm or threaten harm to the Federation. To Justice Scalia, waiting
would reduce the controversy's scope to manageable proportions and flesh out its
factual components.
68
However, the need for a concrete act, which is essential y a "ripeness" require-
ment, may create a test that is difficult for beneficiaries of agency action to meet.
69
Justice Scalia looked at the ripeness of what was admittedly a rule, namely an indi-
vidual Public Land Order.7" He interprets the PLO as simply announcing how the
BLM will manage the land in the future: "It may well be, then, that even those
individual actions will not be ripe for challenge until some Further agency action or
inaction more immediately harming the plaintiff occurs." 1 Justice Scalia, there-
fore, ignores the immediacy of harm that the Court of App, als recognized. Indeed,
Justice Scalia emphasized the regulations that require the 3LM to approve a mine
plan in certain circumstances.,2 Deferring analysis until a plan is submitted might
make review more concrete because the extent of any p :oposed activity will be
known," but it overlooks the private rights that the Mining Law of 1872 grants.
National Wildlife Federation, however, insists on two prerequisites for judicial
review of agency action: the plaintiffs must delineate harm that is both specific
and immediate. The dual requirements may make it difficult for those seeking
66. See National Wildlife Federation 1, 835 F.2d at 316. Justice Blackinun was not certain whether
a system-wide violation existed: "The real issue is whether the acticns and omission that NWF
contends are illegal are themselves part of a plan or policy." Lujan, 11) S. Ct. at 3201 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). For an argument that a well-defined policy existed, se Treangen, supra note 4, at
157-58.
67. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3190.
68. Id.
69. The regulated will have an easier time: "The major exception [to awaiting concrete harm to
review a rule] is a substantive rule which as a practical matter requires the plaintiffto adjust his conduct
immediately." Id.
70. Id. at 3190 (PLO is a "rule" under APA because it has "general or particular applicability
and future effect. ").
71. Id. This ruling may be the "silver lining" for environmentalists, allowing them to attack the
propriety of a withdrawal or its revocation at a much later date than previ )usly allowed. Sheldon, supra
note 4, at 10565. Other precedent began the statute of limitations at the date of the PLO itself. Shiny
Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1362, 1366 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Mesa Operating
Ltd. v. Department of Interior, 931 F.2d 318, 323 n.30 (5th Cir. 19911 (cannot challenge rule itself
if statute of limitations has run despite timely challenge of rule's application); Sierra Club v. Penfold,
857 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1988) (six year statute of limitations ap~lies to irregularity of rule's
promulgation).
72. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3190 n. 3 (agency action ripe 1br review will occur if permit
granted).
73. As Justice Scalia notes: "[B]efore the grant of such a permit, or (when it will suffice) the filing
of a notice to engage in mining activities, or (when only 'negligible disturbance' will occur) actual mining
of the land, it is impossible to tell where or whether mining activities will occur." Id. at 3191 n.3.
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system-wide relief, namely assuring "across-the-board protection" 74 of wildlife
and natural resources. Justice Scalia's discussion, even if "abstract" and not
germane to the decision, indicates a further entrenchment of the private right
model of standing and ripeness. It reflects his deep-rooted belief in the nature of
71the judicial role and the requirements of separation of powers.
B. LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE
1. Overview
In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court returns to the "injury in fact" equation. Justice
Scalia, writing for a majority of the court, found the plaintiffs did not have a
sufficiently "imminent" individualized harm.7 6 Moreover, a plurality of the court
agreed with Justice Scalia that because the lawsuit could not adequately "redress
the harm," there was no injury in fact. 77 On a more general vein, the majority
emphasized that a plaintiff's desire to enforce procedures required by law does not
expand standing. The context for the decision was a challenge to a revised rule
promulgated by Secretary of Interior.
The Secretary of Interior, through the Fish and Wildlife Service, is the lead
agency for compliance with the Endangered Species Act (ESA).75 The ESA pro-
vides substantive guidance to all federal agencies, but also requires them to consult
with the Fish and Wildlife Service to insure that actions they fund, authorize or
carry out are not "likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of [critical] habitat of such species. . . . "'9 Initially, consultation was required
regardless of where the activity would take place.i ° In 1986, the Secretary promul-
gated a rule that rescinded the need to consult when federal agencies authorized,
funded, or carried out projects in foreign lands."'
Defenders of Wildlife challenged the rule's validity. It sued only the Department
of Interior and did not seek to compel action on any particular project. As injury,
74. Id. at 3191.
75. See id.; infra notes 181-211, sources cited, and accompanying text. See also Poisner, supra note
4, at 348-50 (separation of powers analysis explains requirement of proof of injury as opposed to
Warren Court's acceptance of plausible allegation of injury).
76. The alignment of the Court is surprising. Justice Scalia was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Justice O'Connor, who normally asserts separation of
powers arguments for standing, joined Justice Blackmun's dissent. Justice Stevens, who generally
finds in favor of access, did so here; he concurred in the result based on his view of the substantive
law, not on the standing issue. The access-closing majority is not as firm as it might appear. In addition
to justice O'Connor's defection, Justices Kennedy and Souter sounded a caveat in their concurrence.
They would not rule out standing based on relationships to issues or based on congressionally created
rights that differ from common law analogues. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
77. Justices Kennedy and Souter did not join in this portion of the decision. Defenders of Wildlife,
112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
78. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
80. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04 (1984).
81. 51 Fed. Reg. 19926, 19930 (June 3, 1986) (consultation only needed for activities within the
United States or on the high seas).
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its complaint alleged an interest in enforcement of the ]HSA because members
of the organization benefit both professionally and peronally from observing
threatened and endangered species that have a range beyond the borders of the
United States.82 Additionally, they supplemented the record by referring to three
ongoing projects, all of which were being carried out or fur ded by federal agencies
and could impact threatened or endangered species. These .ncluded the Mahaweli,
Picchis-Palcazu, and Aswan Dam projects.83 The lack of .consultation because of
the rule allegedly would increase the likelihood of diminished opportunities to
observe endangered species in foreign lands.
The district court found no actual or threatened injury traceable to the regula-
tory reinterpretation for several reasons.8 4 First, no one would know when or if
the projects would impact the species. Second, consultatio.a may have occurred in
the past with nothing to gain from further consultatior. Finally, because the
agencies contemplating action were not sued, a second suit enjoining them would
be required to redress the harm. Therefore, the current -ase must be dismissed
because it sought to determine the law in the abstract.85
The Eighth Circuit reversed because standing had bee a proven sufficiently to
withstand a motion to dismiss.88 First, because the ESA has a "citizen suit"
provision, 87 the prudential limitations on standing were immaterial; only the con-
stitutional "injury in fact" was needed.88 The court fourd the requirement met
because not only did Defenders allege an interest in preserving endangered species,
but it also alleged that specific projects in foreign countries which had been visited
by members, were increasing the likelihood of extincticn. 8' This provided the
concrete injury from the procedural harm alleged, namel-' that regulations man-
dating proper consultation were required.9"
The Eighth Circuit also considered whether the harm allged was fairly traceable
to the Secretary's action and whether ordering a proper regulation would redress
the injury.9" It found such a connection. Under the new regulation there would
be no consultation on ongoing projects that could jeopardize protected species or
their habitat. Harm was, therefore, traceable to those regutlations. Causation was
not too attenuated simply because foreign governments and action agencies also
had input into the decisions on whether projects would proceed. Congress declared
consultation to be the remedy for prospective danger to piotected species. There-
fore, the harm is redressable without suing the action agencies. They would consult
82. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43, 46 (D. Minn. 1987).
83. Id. at 47-48. Respectively, the activities are in Sri Lanka, Per n, and Egypt.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 48.
86. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988:1.
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988) ("any person" may commence a suit to enjoin any person alleged
to be in violation of the Act).
88. Defenders of Wildlife, 851 F.2d at 1039.
89. Id. at 1040.
90. The district court had also required proof that the funded or aut iorized activities would harm
endangered or threatened species. This is an inappropriate standard; it would require the plaintiff to
perform the study it is attempting to force the Secretary to require. lo. at 1042.
91. Id. at 1042-43.
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if a regulation required it, and consultation would assure that serious harm to the
endangered and threatened species would not be overlooked.92
On remand, the district court reached the merits and found the new regulation
violated the ESA, which requires consultation on foreign projects.93 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed.94 On the standing issue, it considered affidavits of two members,
who detailed actual presence at impacted sites. Amy Skillbred visited Sri Lanka to
observe wildlife habitat and intended to return. The Mahaweli project, funded by
the Agency for International Development, would harm her through its impact on
wildlife.95 Similarly, Joyce Kelly had visited Egypt and would be injured by the
Aswan High Dam. She intended to return. 96 The specificity of the affidavits and
subsequent deposition testimony met the requirement of National Wildlife Federa-
tion.9 7 In addition, the Eighth Circuit eschewed the need for any "geographical
nexus" when a plaintiff seeks to vindicate a right to insist on specific procedures.98
The petition for certiorari did not directly question whether concrete injury was
alleged in the sense of National Wildlife Federation specificity. It appeared to raise
questions of redressability and "program wide" attacks:
Do respondents have standing to challenge regulation ... that merely interprets statu-
tory obligations of federal agencies under Section 7(a)(2) of Endangered Species Act, .
• . when respondents have not challenged any specific action by agency upon which
statutory obligations actually fall? 99
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court hit additional facets of the "injury in fact"
definition. As Justice Scalia would phrase it, an injury in fact requires invasion
of a legally protected interest that is concrete, particularized and also "actual or
imminent." Moreover, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action
and it must be " 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will
be 'redressed by a favorable decision.' '"°° The majority of the Court addressed
the issues of imminence of harm and how to treat procedural injuries; a plurality
also found the injury was not likely to be redressed. The imminence of harm and
redressability discussions have the most generalized import for standing law.'
01
92. Id. at 1043.
93. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989). Although standing was
again challenged, the court found that nothing materially differed from the situation apprised by the
Eighth Circuit. Id. at 1083-84.
94. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990).
95. Id. at 120.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 50-52. A third affidavit, which dealt with the Picchis-Palcazu project in Peru,
was not sufficiently specific because the member making it only came within several hundred miles
of the project. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 121 n.2.
98. 911 F.2d at 121.
99. U.S. Dept. of Interior, Petition for Certiorari, Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, No. 90-1424.
100. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
101. The procedural discussion acknowledged that an agency's failure to follow prescribed procedure
can create an injury in fact without proof that harm would necessarily occur if the agency decision was
implemented or that following the procedures would change the agency's decision. Nevertheless, in order
to proceed, the plaintiff must show a concrete, particularized injury beyond the generalized desire to see
compliance with the law. A statute allowing "any person" to sue for "any alleged violation" may not
eliminate this requirement. Id. at 2142-46. Justice Kennedy, who concurred in an opinionjoined by Justice
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2. The Imminent Harn Decision
Justice Scalia prefaced his discussion with a summation of the result of his
standing theories: namely that "when the plaintiff is not I imself the object of the
government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but is
ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish."' 0'2 As in National Wildlife
Federation, there was no question that the environmental in :erests were cognizable
injuries." 3 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, writing for a six-person majority, found
that the injury alleged did not rise to the level of an injury in fact because it was
not sufficiently "imminent."
Factually, the problem arose because the affidavits and lepositional testimony
of Skillbred and Kelly showed that while they had used ands impacted by the
foreign projects in the past, they merely alleged that they intended to return in the
future.0 4 Therefore, to Justice Scalia, this meant it was uncertain whether they
would be imminently harmed: "Such 'some day' intent'ons-without any de-
scription of concrete plans, or indeed even any specificationi of when the some day
will be-do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases
require. "'5 Harm to a cognizable interest was immaterikl unless the particular
plaintiff would return to the impacted site. Mere destruction of habitat or animals
once observed was insufficient.
The plaintiffs proposed three additional theories to connect themselves to the
threatened injury to the animals: the "ecosystem nexus,' the "animal nexus,"
and the "occupational nexus." Justice Scalia rejected all i:hree. The theory that
would have allowed anyone who used any portion of an interconnected ecosystem
to have standing would allow those not perceptibly affected into court and violate
the National Wildlife Federation disapproval of allegations of use "in the vicinity"
of the threatened action.0 6 Finally, neither those connected by an interest in
animals nor those having a professional connection to the Ihreatened and endan-
gered animals could have standing on these bases alone To Justice Scalia, a
geographical connection to the specific area impacted by the proposed actions is
a prerequisite or the injury in fact requirement would be meaningless.'0 7
The injury in fact discussion commanded a majority of the Court, but Justices
Souter and Kennedy expressed some concerns in their concurrence.5 5 First, they
Souter, cautioned that common law models may not suffice for the complex rel itionships of modern society;
Congress could "define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will giv rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before." Id. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 2137 (citations omitted).
103. Id. (desire to use or observe animal "even for purely aesthetic Furposes" is cognizable).
104. Id. at 2138.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 2139.
107. Id. at 2139-40.
108. Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and O'Connor totally rejected the analysis. Stevens noted that
the important question was the imminence of the environmental harm, not the return visit. Id. at
2148 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, opined that the
majority was requiring a return to code pleading and the formulistic pur zhase of an airplane ticket.
The seriousness of concern and the professional interests of Skillbred ant Kelly would have allowed
a finder of fact to conclude that they would return to the areas. Id. at 2152-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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recognized that requiring concrete plans for a return trip may seem petty, but
thought it appropriate when dealing with land that the plaintiff did not regularly
use.109 On the three "nexus" theories, they agreed they did not confer standing
on these facts, but would not rule out their propriety in other settings.°"0 Justice
Scalia's tightening of the "directly affected" and imminent harm requirements
may drive some members of the Court to reconsider whether a "special interest"
in the subject matter would be sufficient to confer standing. This was, of course,
the theory rejected in Sierra Club v. Morton."'
3. The Redressability Decision
Justice Scalia also faulted standing because the injury may not have been
redressed solely by a decision directed to the parties sued. He only commanded a
plurality for this portion of the opinion. "2 Nevertheless, it provides insight into the
philosophy oftightened access. The problem here differed from that in National Wild-
life Federation; a regulation existed embodying the Secretary of Interior's view of the
scope of required ESA consultation and hence there was agency action by the Fish
and Wildlife Service.1" According to justice Scalia, the plaintiff's error in Defenders
of Wildlife was its failure to seek to remedy individual instances of agency action or
inaction dealing with proposed projects. Attacking the rule was a programmatic
approach, one which leads to causation and redressibility problems. "
4
To challenge the regulation, the plaintiffs sued only the Department of Interior,
not the agencies authorizing or funding activities in foreign lands. Therefore,
Justice Scalia found no assurance that the action agencies would acquiesce in a
judgment directed toward the Department of Interior; they had at various times
questioned whether Interior's regulations were binding on them. 5 To be guaran-
teed that specific harm would be averted, individual projects of individual agencies
must be challenged and those agencies joined in the suit.
The project-by-project approach would be difficult and not necessarily produc-
tive. In National Wildlife Federation, Justice Scalia stated that a decision on one
action taken pursuant to an "agency program" could of necessity impact the
entire program." 6 Many agencies, however, are involved in ESA consultations. A
change in procedure by the Department of Interior and the joined agency would
not create any precedent for other action agencies underJudge Scalia's thinking. l7
109. Id. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
110. Id.
111. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
112. Justices Kennedy and Souter would not address the issue.
113. Compare National WildlifeFed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3180-90. Quoted supra in text accompanying note
63.
114. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2140.
115. Id. at 2141-42.
116. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3190-92, see supra notes 64-65.
117. Cf Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2788 (1992) (Scalia, J. concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (cannot presume that non-parties would abide by pronouncements of law in
a suit or redressability meaningless: "Redressability requires that the court be able to afford relief
through the exercise of its power, not through the persuasive or even awe-inspiring effect of the opinion
explaining the exercise of its power.") For practical difficulties in pursuing a case-by-case approach,
see Mansfield, supra note 6, at 63.
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If the plaintiff sought a definitive ruling on the scope of the ESA, it would have
tojoin all agencies that could conceivably fund or authorize extraterritorial activity
and find members impacted by a proposed project of eaih agency.
If a plaintiff adopted either the single project or multi-pr )ject litigation strategy,
however, Justice Scalia could assert an additional barrier: because foreign nations
were involved in the decision making, there was no assurance that the projects
would be modified or abandoned based on the results of cor.sultation. ' Therefore,
no way may exist to ascertain the scope of Congress's command to agencies of the
United States. Domestic responsibilities would remain unclear if they implicate
foreign nations. This shield could not have been intended by Congress nor should
it be required by the Constitution. Justice Scalia, however, did not speak for a
majority and three Justices affirmatively rejected both of Justice Scalia's barriers
to standing based on the completeness of any possible rtmedy."
9
C. AIR COURIER CONFERENCE OF AMERICA V. POSTA., WORKERS UNION,
AFL-CIO
1. Overview
In National Wildlife Federation, the Court briefly explained that the APA requires
a plaintiff to have "suffered legal wrong" because of the challenged action or to
have been "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the acticn "within the meaning
of the relevant statute. "20 In National Wildlife Federation, the Supreme Court found
the "zone-of-interest" test posed no barrier; the environmental interests claimed
were exactly the type of interests both NEPA and FLPMA were to protect. 2 '
Nevertheless, it offered an example of when the test would not be met:
[T]he failure of an agency to comply with a statutory provision requiring "on the record"
hearings would assuredly have an adverse effect upon the company that has the contract
to record and transcribe the agency's proceedings; but since tile provision was obviously
enacted to protect the interests of parties to the proceedings ani I not those of the reporters,
that company would not be "adversely affected within the rieaning" of the statute.
122
118. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2142. This ignores Justice Sc;Iia's own discussion of proce-
dural injuries. See supra discussion accompanying note 101.
119. Justice Stevens argued that courts should presume that if the Supreme Court decides that the
ESA requires consultation, executive agencies would abide by the ruling Moreover, because Congress
ordered consultation, an impact on projects through that consultation :;hould be implied. Id. at 2149
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor emphasized that the action
agencies were active participants in the suit and could be collaterally bo nd by a judgment. Addition-
ally, the funding levels were significant in amounts so as to get the attuntion of foreign governments
if changes in the projects were indicated after consultation. Id. at 2154-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3186 (quoting § 702 of the APA).
121. Id. at 3187. Defenders of Wildlife also had no problem on this theory.
122. Id. at 3186. CompareJudge Williams's example of a party not enti led to standing: "IfCongress
authorized bank regulators to mandate physical security measures for banks ... a shoal of security
services firms might enjoy a profit potential .... But in the absence oi either some explicit evidence
of an intent to benefit such firms, or some reason to believe that such firris would be unusually suitable
champions of Congress's ultimate goals, no one would suppose thein to have standing to attack
regulatory laxity." Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
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In Air Courier, the Supreme Court found an opportunity to give flesh to this hypotheti-
cal.123 Its overt constriction of the "zone-of-interest" test will have lasting impact.
The plaintiff in Air Courier was a union representing postal workers. It objected
when the Postal Service approved an exception to the Private Express Statutes (PES)124
for "international remailing. "'2 Exceptions to the Postal Service monopoly are only
available where the "public interest requires the suspension."' 26 The union claimed
the rulemaking did not support such a finding. The District Court disagreed, granting
a summary judgment in favor of the Postal Service. 12 7 The Fifth Circuit reversed. 28
To reverse the district court and reach the merits, the Court of Appeals found
the postal unions had standing. To it, their interests fell within the zone of interest
of the relevant statute, namely the PES, for two reasons. First, the PES had been
reenacted as part of larger Postal Reorganization Act (PRA), which includes
provisions dealing with labor. Because the PES is the "linchpin" of a financially
viable postal service, it was related to the interests of the unions expressed in other
sections of the Postal Reorganization Act. 2 9 Additionally, without looking beyond
the PES to the larger act, the PES and the unions' concerns were connected: "the
revenue protective purposes of the PES, standing alone, plausibly relate to the
Unions' interest in preventing the reduction of employment opportunities."-30
Quite logically, the Court of Appeals concluded "postal workers benefit from the
PES's function in ensuring [the Postal Service with] a sufficient revenue base.'" 3'
The Supreme Court would not agree that this interest would grant standing to
challenge a purported violation of the PES.
2. Zone-of-Interest Test
For the first time, the Supreme Court found a plaintiff beyond the zone of
interest of a relevant statute. 32 It characterized the postal workers' unions as
123. For further explication of the "zone" test, see infra text and authorities cited accompanying
notes 176-83.
124. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1699 and 39 U.S.C. §§ 601-606 (1988).
125. The history of the controversy is as follows: Air Couriers Conference of America relied on
the exception for "urgent letters" to provide "international remailing," that is, taking letters abroad
to be mailed in another country's system. The Postal Service thought this was an inappropriate use
of the "urgent letter" exception. It therefore promulgated a rule for a separate PES suspension for
"international remailing." Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 915-16.
126. 39 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1988).
127. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service, 701 F. Supp. 880
(D.D. C. 1988); vacated, 891 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1989); cert. granted sub. nom., Air Courier Conference
of America v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 496 U.S. 904 (1990); dismissal denied, 111
S. Ct. 32 (1990); rev 'd, 111 S. Ct. 913 (1991). Air Courier Conference, an entity that used the exception,
had joined the lawsuit aligned with the Postal Service.
128. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service, 891 F.2d 304,
306 (D.C. Cir. 1989)(regulation arbitrary and capricious because it only considered costs to users);
cert. granted sub. nom, Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-
CIO, 496 U.S. 904 (1990); dismissal denied, 111 S. Ct. 32 (1990); rev'd, I llS. Ct. 913 (1991).
129. Id. at 310.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 346-48 (1984), milk consumers
were "within the zone" of the relevant statute. Judicial review at their behest, however, was precluded
by detailed statutory provisions granting named parties specific remedies.
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analogous to the court reporters discussed in National Wildlife Federation.' Both
groups would have the injury in fact required by § 702 of the APA, 3 4 but the
harm they suffered was not within "the meaning of the relevant statute." Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected both rationales the Court of Appeals
used to justify including the unions within the act's "zone of interest."
First, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court of Appeils for holding that the
revenue protection purposes of PES relate to interests the u -ions have in preserving
job opportunities. He found that their analysis "conflates i:he zone-of-interests test
with injury in fact."' 35 The loss of economic opportunity may injure the unions'
members, as the court reporters in the hypothetical wtre injured, but Justice
Rehnquist insisted on examining the statute involved to ,ee if Congress intended
to protect jobs. As stated in National Wildlife Federation, the relevant statute is "the
statute whose violation is the gravamen of the complaint.' i36 According to justice
Rehnquist, neither the basic wording of the PES nor its legislative history reveal
a congressional intent to protect job security:" 7 "The postal monopoly . . . exists
to ensure that postal services will be provided to the citizenry at-large, and not to
secure employment for postal workers."'
38
Second, the Supreme Court disagreed about whether a court should go beyond
the PES and examine the intent of the Postal Reorganization Act in its entirety.
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that previous cases con, idered other sections of
a larger act of which the statute under which the case was brought was a part, but
those cases were distinguished. 3 9 In Clarke, the specific pcovision at issue was an
exception to the main rule embodied in the remainder of the act. Hence, the
policies behind the other portions of the act were relevant to understanding the
provision allegedly violated. 4 0 The challenged statute and larger act did not have
this relationship in Air Courier:
The only relationship between the PES, upon which the Unions rely for their claim on
the merits, and the labor-management provisions of the PRjA, upon which the Unions
rely for their standing, is that both were included in the gereral codification of postal
statutes embraced in the PRA .... [T]o accept this level of generality on defining the
"relevant statute" could deprive the zone-of-interests test oF virtually all meaning.14 1
The Supreme Court found no connection between the two parts of the code. "
2
133. See supra text accompanying note 121.
134. Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 917-18. (District Court found injury in f tct and finding not appealed).
135. Id. at 918.
136. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3187.
137. Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 918-19.
138. Id. at 920.
139. Id., referring to Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 31:8 (1987), Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S 150 (1970), md Investment Co. Institute
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
140. Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 920.
141. Id. at 921. Compare Securities Industry Association, 765 F.2d at 1196,*Scalia,J., dissenting) (stand-
ing under one act not sufficient to raise questions about another statu :e).
142. Compare Securities Industrial Association, 765 F. 2d at 1197 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (competitors
bringing suit no more within zone protected by statute than are "busine ses competing for the parking
spaces that an unlawful [banking] branch may occupy.")
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The Supreme Court did not have to read the statutes as narrowly as it did. The
postal workers, being a part of the Postal Service, have a greater relationship to
it than court reporters have to the general public who are granted rights under a
statute for a hearing on the record. The workers are, in the words of Clarke, 143 more
than "marginally related" to the purposes of the statute because an economically
viable Post Office is a prerequisite for their employment.
If postal workers could not sue, under the Court's view, no one may be able
to challenge the Postal Service determination at issue. The reading of the zone test
being forwarded requires a clear indication from Congress that a particular party
is to be allowed to bring suit. 144 The public definitely is not envisioned as a check
on executive action.
III. Past is Prologue: Consolidation of the Private Law Model
The current conservative majority of the Supreme Court is completing a re-insti-
tution of the private law model of standing. Those suffering "legal wrong" will
easily obtain standing. 145 Property and contract rights, which are most easily
embraced within this model, will be protected. 146 Within limits, standing will also
be available for those especially noted by Congress. 147
This tendency reflects an earlier era. 148 Initially only plaintiffs suffering wrong
to a "legal interest" had standing to seek judicial review. 149 Plaintiffs meeting the
test could proceed either through statutory or non-statutory review. 50 In both
143. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 396-97.
144. Cf Mary Christine Hutton, The Unique Perspective ofJustice White. Separation of Powers, Standing
and Section 1983 Cases, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 377, 404 (1988).
145. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 885-86 (1983), where he argues against bifurcating standing into constitu-
tional and prudential concerns: "As I would prefer to view the matter, the Court must always hear
the case of a litigant who asserts the violation of a legal right."
146. Cf Payne v. Tennessee, I IlS. Ct. 2597, 2610, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 28 (1991 ) (stare decisis
more important for property and contracts where people rely on precedents than for procedural and
evidentiary rules).
147. Congress, however, cannot exceed the Constitution in granting standing. See Scalia, supra note
145, at 886 (case and controversy requirement limits Congress) and id. at 894 (broad grants of standing
would resemble two branches ganging up on the third, the executive). See also Defenders qf Wildlife, 112
S. Ct. at 2145.
148. For more complete discussion, see Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem
of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1417-58 (1988).
149. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939) (no standing "unless the
right invaded is a legal right-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against
tortious invasion, or one founded on a Statute which confers a privilege."). Eligible plaintiffs were
of two types, those with complaints analogous to a common law cause of action, and those granted
the right of appeal by being among the parties classified as "aggrieved" within a particular statute.
Seegeneraly Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645,
649-52 (1973) and Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim of Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974).
150. Scalia, supra note 145, at 889 (initial scheme gave broader rights of review under specific
"statutory" grants; non-statutory review was the generalized right to protect a "legal interest" by
way of mandamus and injunction.) See also Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review
ofFederal Administrative Action: Some Conclusionsfrom the Public-lands Cases, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 867, 870-71
n.13 (1970).
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instances, the emphasis was on the individualistic sphere, limiting judicial access
to those vindicating private rights. 5 ' Under this view, the regulated industry had
access to the courts, but it was difficult for intended beneficiaries of regulation to
proceed in court.
This narrow door to the courthouse was championed by Justices who supported
the New Deal and the right of legislatures to experiment with social legislation. 
5 2
They feared that court interference could too easily result in invalidation of statutes
under the substantive due process of Lochnerian thinking 153 Therefore, the New
Deal model of an agency included deference to agency c xpertise and sought to
insulate the agency from central policy control, isolate it from the executive, and
limit judicial oversight of its activities. 15 4 Hence, the heyday of the agency under
the New Deal has been referred to as a "technocratic era.' 
'55
A period of agency distrust followed the enshrinement of the agency during the
New Deal. Two important legal changes opened access to the courts by those
questioning agencies after the initial New Deal era. 156 The first building block for
increased access was re-interpreting the types of injuries hat could be judicially
cognizable.'57 Injuries more varied than economic harm cc uld suffice. The second
impetus was interpreting the APA as an independent sourc e of standing to review
agency action when no other remedy was available."58
151. Thus referred to as a "private law model," Cass R. Sunstein, '-tanding and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1438 (1988)(arose from two idea:;: belief that judiciary exists
to protect common law interests from government and fear of those sympathetic to regulation that
without standing barriers regulation would be hindered). This is not to be :onfused with what Professor
Mashaw refers to as "an individualist model," which has expansive judic ial access. Jerry L. Mashaw,
"Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1131 (19E 3) (citizen participation and
official accounting for public decisions are available on demand).
152. See, e.g. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) ("A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge E:overnmental action of a sort
that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the courts. Or standing
may be based on an interest created by the Constitution or a statute. But if no comparable common-law
right exists and no such constitutional or statutory interest has been cieated, relief is not available
judicially.") (citations omitted).
153. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)(state law regulating working hours unconstitu-
tional). See Sunstein, supra note 151, at 1436-38 and 1456-57.
154. See Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Dal: Coal and the Clean Air Act,
89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1471-78 (1980).
155. Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1496-97 (1983).
See also Mashaw, supra note 151, 1129 ("statist" conception of legal lights depends on legislative
definitions of public welfare for content), and id. at 1131 (statist rights st :ucture limits participation).
156. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 I'ARV. L. REV. 1669, 1676-78
(1975), arguing that a disavowal of an objective "public interest" an unguided agency expertise
transformed administrative law.
157. Sunstein, supra note 151, at 1438-39. Professor Nichol argues tha: the difference in what could
be a cognizable "injury" occurred because legal interests change to ref ect society's values. Today,
environmental harms may create judicially recognized private injuries. To a large extent, such recogni-
tion requires empathy by judges. Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L REV. 68, 73, 89-90 (1984).
158. Whether this expansion was initially intended by Congress is ds batable. Compare 4 Kenneth
C. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, at § 24:3, at 214-15 (1983)(inj ary in fact was intended test;
"within the meaning of the relevant statute" not to modify "adversely uffected"); with Scalia, supra
note 145, at 887-88 (Congress only codifying existing law), and Sunstein, supra note 151, at 1441-42
(APA not intended to extend standing).
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The increased access to the judiciary prompted a more public oriented view
both of judicial review 159 and administrative law in general. 160 No longer would
agencies be trusted to single-handedly administer the public interest. Congress,
in legislating in complex fields that impacted on many, could rationally expect that
the intended beneficiaries of regulation would have a role in enforcing the law.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, there was a return to a respect for agency and
congressional prerogatives. This provides another clue to disparate decisions on
standing.'61 Standing is used to defer to the other branches of government by
avoiding judicial review or by reinforcing the ability of these other branches to
make policy choices. For example, Duke Power Co. ultimately upheld a congres-
sional decision to support the development of nuclear power.'62 Therefore, an
opinion on the validity of the Price-Anderson Act was necessary, even if it could
be termed an advisory opinion rather than one generated from a traditional case
or controversy.163 Standing allowed a congressional policy choice to be affirmed.
In Bryant v. Yellen 164 and Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation,'65 the more
generous grants of standing similarly aided agency policy choices because they
upheld agency decisions that had been invalidated below.
Examined from the perspective of impact on agency choices, both the opinions
restricting standing and the unusually liberal ones that grant it after the Warren
court era can be explained as part of a single phenomenon: a trend away from
active review of agency actions. '66 Courts are less apt to second-guess an agency
or even force it to respond more fully because more and more agency decisions
159. Referred to as a part of an independent "public law," Sunstein, supra note 151, at 1450.
Mashaw's terminology calls it "an individualistic model." Mashaw, supra note 151, at 1131. In the
dichotomy of Shapiro, this would be a "democratic" tendency. Shapiro, supra note 155, at 1497.
160. Stewart, supra note 156, at 1670, 1760-62 ("interest representation" model of administrative
law is one in which agencies provide forums to fine tune legislative actions rather than merely imple-
menting predetermined statutory goals or being viewed as uniquely qualified to protect the public
interest).
161. Compare Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 78 (plaintiff has standing because damage limitation
statute could have caused plant to be built); Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) (residents desiring
to purchase lands could challenge whether acreage restrictions should force below market price sales
of property); Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, 454 U.S. 151 (1981) (state could seek
review of general Department of Interior program); with Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973) (no standing to seek review of constitutionality of decision to not prosecute fathers of illegitimate
children because threat of criminal prosecution would not compel child support); Allen, 468 U.S. 737
(1984) (parents cannot challenge IRS policy that allowed private non-profit schools which discriminated
against African-Americans to retain tax-exempt status); and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (no standing because no proof requirements on indigent care needed
for tax exempt status caused plaintiffs' denial of medical services).
162. 438 U.S. at 78. Compare Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 557-58 (1978)(Congress and agency decides whether to develop nuclear
energy).
163. See conclusion ofJustice Stevens, Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 102 (concurring) and Davis, supra
note 158, § 24:33, 328-29 (justified in Duke because constitutional uncertainties defeated congressional
purpose).
164. 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
165. 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
166. Cf Fallon, supra note 43, at 45 (standing analysis overprotects defendants because it prevents
adjudication as a threshold doctrine rather than deciding a case on the merits).
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not only are based on scientific evidence that requires complex predictions, 167 but
also involve statutes in which Congress failed to give dirct guidance on how or
even what it wanted implemented.168 In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court
responded to the latter dilemma by reading a statute in o 7der to locate the policy
choice and thus create "law to apply," which would enable judicial review. 69 In
the early 1990s, the Court's response to an unclear statule is to allow the agency
to fill in the blank.
170
The standing aspects of National Wildlife Federation, Air Courier and, Defenders of
Wildlife are part of a new insulation of agency determinations from judicial review,
which in turn mirrors the New Deal attitude. The trend of decisions that found
standing in order to re-assert agency determinations did not continue with Defenders
of Wildlife and National Wildlife Federation: The denial of standing in both cases left
open questions about the propriety of the regulation on the ESA's scope and the
BLM's withdrawal review procedures. Curbing access may be more important
than upholding individual agency decisions because in the long-term closing the
door will insulate numerous decisions.
As in the days of the New Deal, there has been a technocratic resurgence, a
desire for agencies to rationally solve problems.1 71 In such a situation, judges are
not necessarily adept at review. Therefore, it is not surpri:;ing that there has been
a similar return to earlier models of standing. 172
In addition to implications for standing doctrine, there is a second facet to the
National Wildlife Federation decision- that dealing with ripc ness. As interpreted by
Justice Scalia, ripeness doctrine may limit review to individual actions rather than
allowing lawsuits to seek system-wide relief. Linking standing and ripeness in this
manner furthers the majority's view that under a governme'nt of distinct branches,
the judiciary must avoid even appearing to invade pr rogatives of the other
branches. This reflects the philosophical underpinnings of the cases.
167. Baltimore Gas &Electric Co., 462 U.S. at 102. See also The Honorabl,: Antonin Scalia, Responsibili-
ties of Regulatory Agencies under Environmental Laws, 24 HOUSTON L. RE%. 97, 98 (1987) (substantial
evidence test used to review factual determinations but in complex situatio is "court feels less competent
to 'second guess' than it would the factual judgments of a jury.")
168. Justice Scalia argues that deference to agencies is no longer driven primarily by the need for
agencies to apply expertise to complex facts. Deference is appropriate not because agencies are "ex-
perts," but because many decisions do not have one "correct" answer. They involve policy choices.
The Honorable Antonin Scalia,Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 517-21. For an examination of this phenomenon as applied to the B reau of Land Management,
see Maria E. Mansfield, The "Public" in Public Land Appeals: A Case Stud, in "Reformed" Administrative
Law and Proposal for Orderly Participation, 12 HARV. ENv. L. REV. 465, 4)0-99 (1988).
169. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 '1971) (statute requires park
uses to be given priority).
170. Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United )istribution Companies, 111
S. Ct. 615 (1991)(upholding discretion of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
171. Shapiro, supra note 155, at 1499-1500.
172. Sunstein, supra note 151, at 1432-33 (return to private law moddl); Mashaw, supra note 151,
at 1138 (return to the statist model). Professors Shapiro and Glicksman idntify this as part of a general
trend towards executive implementation and away from a system of che :ks and balances. Sidney A.
Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quie. Revolution, 1988 DUKE L.J.
819, 846-63.
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IV. Separation of Powers: Standing and the APA
The recent Supreme Court decisions exemplify several strains of thought. One,
made explicit in National Wildlife Federation and echoed in Defenders of Wildlife, is
that standing and ripeness doctrine can promote a formal, compartmentalized
separation of powers analysis.173 The relationship between Justice Scalia's aca-
demic writings and this doctrine has been noted often. 17 4 His concentration on the
APA's provisions in National Wildlife Federation, however, contracts ripeness and
standing into one analysis. More importantly, it also attempts to cement theory
into practice.
A. THEORIES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
Although it is clear that some conservative standing decisions draw upon the
idea of separation of powers, this concept itself is not a model of clarity as a
doctrine.' 75 One of its primary purposes is to prevent any one branch of govern-
ment from exercising power to the extent that it could threaten freedom. 7 6 To
describe its purpose, however, is not necessarily a description of how separation
of powers should operate.
There are two models of separation of powers analysis: the formal and the
functional.' 77 With the growth of administrative agencies, the functional theory
may be more appropriate than the traditional formal theory of three compartmen-
talized branches.178 Nevertheless, the formal theory appears to be the philosophy
173. See, e.g., response to allegations of "rampant" violations of law in program: "Perhaps [it is]
so. But respondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of the program by court decree, rather than
in the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are
normally made" (emphasis in original). National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3190. In Defenders of
Wildlife, Justice Scalia declared: "Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in
government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief
Executive." 112 S. Ct. at 2145.
174. For a comparison of Justice Scalia's scholarly work and his judicial output as an appellate
judge, see Comment (Perino), supra note 8, at 156-72. See also Sheldon, supra note 4 and Poisner, supra
note 4, at 353-57.
175. To begin with, the United States Constitution does not even mention "separation of powers,"
but merely delineates three separate federal branches of government that share ultimate power. The
doctrine may not be a doctrine but merely a theory, one which provides only a "framework" for
analysis rather than strict rules. Arthur S. Miller, Separation of Powers: An Ancient Doctrine under Modern
Challenge, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 299 (1976).
176. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) (a "bulwark against tyranny"). See, e.g.,
Ralph F. Fuchs, An Approach to Administrative Law, 18 N.C.L. REV. 183, 194 (1940) and Edward H.
Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUMBIA L. REV. 371 (1976). But see Miller, supra note
175 at 302 (separation also promotes efficiency).
177. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987). The formal views each branch as tightly confined
to its enumerated powers. The functional approach stresses core functions-relationships between the
branches may be flexible if these core functions are not threatened. Id. Under the functional view, the
branches may overlap and create checks and balances. Hutton, supra note 144, at 389-95 (creating a
flexible government that may respond to change).
178. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578-79 (1984) (formal three branch theory as traditionally expressed cannot
describe our government; model should look to separation of functions and checks and balances with
agencies as inferior parts of government controlled by the other three).
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forwarded in these cases.' It begins with the Court's constitutional role. The
judiciary is empowered to decide various enumerated "cases" and "controver-
sies.",0 Standing and ripeness are designed to keep courts in their appointed
realm. Justice Scalia in National Wildlife Federation and D-Jenders of Wildlife aligns
with this belief and uses the doctrines to prevent what he would term governance
by the judiciary.""'
Despite the current views of Justice Scalia, which are not unique to him, the
Supreme Court has not uniformly viewed standing as linked inexorably to separa-
tion of powers.' 12 Some Justices have believed that members of the public are
given standing because they are proper "checks" on the executive within the
constitutional framework. 8 3 In general terms, ChiefJustice Warren wrote for the
Court in Flast v. Cohen of the need to distinguish standing from other issues of
justiciability. Because standing concentrates on the "who." it would not implicate
separation of powers. 8 Other doctrines ofjusticiability, s ich as the political ques-
tion doctrine, 85 address substantive issues that implica:e separation of powers
analysis. In 1984, most of the Justices who would later ditsent in National Wildlife
Federation endorsed this view. 1
86
179. Cf., Strauss, supra note 178, at 626-28 (siren call of certaint, influenced cases decided in
1982-83) and Frederick R. Anderson, Revisiting The Constitutional Statts of Administrative Agencies, 36
AMER. U. L. REV. 277, 291-92 (1987) (noting formalism in separatioa of powers decisions).
180. U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 2. Some argue this means that standing and otherjusticiability doctrines
should preclude a court decision that did not arise in what would hay been a "judicial" setting at
the time of the Constitution.Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at 150 (Frankfurter, J.) This
historically phrased limitation is read by some as forcing courts to esch w advisory opinions and only
act at the behest of a person concretely injured. The historical eviden e, however, does not support
this view. Informer and relator suits and mandamus actions allowec courts to intervene in other
situations. SeeWinter, supra note 148, at 1394-1417. See also Davis, suprw note 158, at § 24:5 (advisory
opinions at time of constitution).
181. Justice Scalia had espoused this view previously in his scholarly writing. See, e.g., Scalia, supra
note 145.
182. In an issue-dependent plea, Justice Douglas objected to the Soli, itor General's attempt to raise
the specter of "government by the judiciary" when examining stand ng. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. at 745 (Douglas, J., dissenting). To Justice Douglas, natural resources could too easily be
trammelled because of agency "capture" and broad authority to act iii the "public interest." Id. at
745-51. Therefore, the problem was not one of judicial interference, l ut of assuring that nature not
be destroyed before being considered. Allowing standing furthers this end. Id. at 750.
183. Hutton, supra note 144, at 387 (view identified as being that if Justice White).
184. He cautioned:
Such problems arise, if at all, only from the substantive issues the individual seeks to have adjudi-
cated. Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing
is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). Justice Scalia rephrased this solding as follows: "Standing
• . . is only meant to assure that the courts can do their work well, and not to assure that they keep
out of affairs better left to other branches." Scalia, supra note 145, at 891.
185. This doctrine precludes judicial review of controversies "which revolve around policy choices
and value determinations" that the Constitution commits to either the Congress or Executive. Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (196). See Louis Henkin, Is there
a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976) (exists when there are no legally cognizable
standards).
186. Allen, 468 U.S. at 767 (Brennan, J. dissenting); Id. at 79(0-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined by Blackmun, J.). Justice Marshall, who dissented in Nationl Wildlife Fed'n, took no part
in Allen.
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Their reaffirmations of Flast v. Cohen, however, appeared in dissenting opinions
when the Warren Court's era ended. 7 Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority
in Allen v. Wright'55 and succinctly disagreed: "the law of Art. III standing is
built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers.'' 89 Therefore,
the doctrine would provide an independent tool to determine whether standing
exists.'90 In direct opposition to Justice Warren's statement, this view recognizes
that standing can exclude issues as well as persons. If every person who would
raise an issue is denied the right to litigate it, the issue is effectively excluded. 9'
Therefore, separation of powers arguments are made to invalidate suits seeking
system-wide relief from an agency's action or inaction.
B. RATIONALES FOR SEPARATION OF POWERS LIMITATIONS
A lawsuit seeking system-wide relief is one that claims that a general policy or
pattern of action is not in accord with the law. Because such illegality injures
numerous parties, it could, to a certain extent, resemble a generalized complaint
that the government is not acting in accord with the law.' 92 Two main arguments
are made that separation of powers mandates that the courts refuse such cases:
(1) the executive is to "take care" that the laws are executed; and (2) the courts
are to protect individuals.'93 Both can be taken to extremes.
187. Id. See also C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability Decisions of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 862, 863-69 (1985)(contrasting Flast with Burger court decisions that elevate separation of powers
and federalism to primary roles in justiciability decisions). For other Burger court expressions of
separation of powers concerns, see Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (Powell, J.); U.S. v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (Burger, C.J.); Id. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring); Schlessinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22 (Burger, C.J.). See also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at
471 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
188. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices Burger, White, Powell and
Rehnquist.
189. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, which implicates the corollary doctrine
of federalism: the Court stated the proper forum was with "local authorities." 461 U.S. at I11.
190. Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 n.26. ("We disagree with Justice Stevens's suggestion that separation
of powers [principles] merely underlie standing requirements, have no role to play in giving meaning
to those requirements, and should be considered only under a distinct justiciability analysis. ")Justice
O'Connor insisted, however, that the decision in Allen rested on the causation and redressability
requirements of injury in fact. Id.
191. Scalia, supra note 145, at 892. The example he gives is the denial of taxpayer standing, which
makes the legislative and executive branches solely responsible for compliance with the constitutional
requirement that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipt and Expenditures of all public
Money .... be published from time to time." Id. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974) (taxpayer seeking information on CIA expenditures in order to better fulfill duties of informed
voter denied standing).
192. A generalized complaint is repeatedly declared to be insufficient to grant standing. See, e.g.,
Allen, 468 U.S. at 754; Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2144-45 (noting that it had previously been
applied primarily to allegations of constitutional violations). See generally, Floyd, supra note 187, at
871-75. The generalized harm barrier is particularly intractable for several reasons. Even with general-
ized harm, some are more injured or offended than others. Additionally, many cases in which "private"
injury was found also have widely shared injuries and diffuse impacts, such as the right to an abortion
or to be free from segregation or poll taxes. See Albert, supra note 149, at 483 and Id. at 488 (shared
injury not equivalent to mere interest in matter). It is not, therefore, a particularly helpful criterion.
193. For arguments against the traditional rationales for imbuing standing with separation of powers
concerns, see Sunstein, supra note 151, at 1469-74 (noting a third supposed justification, namely that
the president exerts sufficient political control).
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The Allen v. Wright majority reflects the first argument. 7o allow standing when
injuries are generalized would improperly embroil the ju Jiciary in the affairs of
the executive:
[Standing] would pave the way generally for suits challenging, Lot specifically identifiable
Government violations of law, but the particular programs Egencies establish to carry
out their legal obligations. Such suits, even when premised on allegations of several
instances of violations of law, are rarely if ever appropriate for f !deral-court adjudication.
"Carried to its logical end, [respondents'] approach would ha-ie the federal courts virtu-
ally continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of E.:ecutive action.
' 9
4
Rather simplistically, this position maintains that only the President has the power
" 'to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' "'9 This hands-off attitude
ignores the fact that acting illegally outside of the law is not proper "execution of the
laws." 196 Taken to its extreme, this rigid view of separation cf powers would preclude
all judicial review.' 97 But to accept that would be to destroy the concept of a limited
government' 98 and eschew the benefits that can derive from judicial review. 199
Justice Scalia has explained his view of thejudiciary in a slightly different manner.
He bases his analysis in separation of powers, 20 0 but disc vers the key not in the
"take care" clause of the Constitution, but in what he views to be the core role of
courts, namely that they are uniquely suited to protecting rights of individuals and
minorities. 20 ' Therefore, courts should require a plaintiff to show a particularized
injury, one which, injustice Scalia's words, "sets him apart from the citizenry at
large." 20 2 Such a standing requirement helps courts maintain their proper role:
[It] roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic rc le of protecting individuals
and minorities against the impositions of the majority, and e) cludes them from the even
194. Allen, 468 U.S. at 759, quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, V.' (1972). In Laird, the plaintiff
claimed army surveillance of civilian political activity chilled his First Am endment rights. The Supreme
Court referred the plaintiff to Congress, which could control matters through its committees and the
power of the purse.
195. Allen, 468 U.S. at 761, quoting U.S. CONST. art II., § 3, cl. 4. But see Cass R. Sunstein,
Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 670 (1985) ("take care"
clause is a duty, not a license).
196. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 794 (Stevens, J. dissenting):
It has been clear since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id., at 177. Deciding whether
the Treasury has violated a specific legal limitation on its enforcem nt discretion does not intrude
upon the prerogatives of the Executive, for in so deciding we are merely saying "what the law is."
197. Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies: Lessonsfrm Environmental Cases, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984-85).
198. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COL. L. REV. 1 (1983).
199. On the merits of judicial review, see generally, Cass R. Sunst,:in, On the Costs and Benefits of
Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DuKE L.J. 522, 537 (19119) and Shapiro & Glicksman,
supra note 172, at 863-72.
200. Scalia, supra note 145, at 891. (Flast v. Cohen incorrectly sever.d standing from separation of
powers analysis).
201. Scalia, supra note 145, at 894 (emphasis in original). But see diffi ring view of the role of judges,
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Forward: The Forms ofJust ce, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29-30
(1979) (function of judge is to "give proper meaning to our public values").
202. Scalia, supra note 145, at 881-82.
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more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other branches would function in order
to serve the interest of the majority itself.
20 3
If a plaintiff only shows a generalized injury, one shared by the majority of the
public, then relief should be sought in other locales. Again, if taken to an extreme,
this position would create a constitutional paradox: it would require submittal to
a vote of the majority issues that the constitution intentionally removed from
majority control.20 4
Nevertheless, to Justice Scalia, majoritarian grievances are to be redressed in
administrative or legislative venues: "Governmental mischief whose effects are
widely distributed is more readily remedied through the political process, and
does not call into play the distinctive function of the courts as guardians against
oppression of the few by the many. " 20 5 Justice Scalia maintains that courts should
not protect the majority because they are unsuited to that task. He fears that if
courts act when elected officials did not, the judiciary would likely assert the
particular values of individual judges. 206 Judges, being politically unaccountable,
are inappropriate arbiters of values. 20 7 Justice Scalia assigns majoritarian interests
to the political branches. 20 8 According to Justice Scalia, courts should not inter-
vene.
203. Id. at 894.
204. David R. Dow, Standing andRights, 36 EMORY L.J. 1195, 1213-14(1987). Additionally, political
solutions may be unavailable, especially when agency non-action is at issue. Peter Lehner, Note,
Judicial Review ofAdministrative Inaction, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 627, 639 (1983) (Congress believes it already
did its job by passing statute).
205. Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1256 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.,
concurrinng in part and dissenting in part), reversed Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467
U.S. 340 (1984). See also National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3190. Cf., United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. at 179 (under representative government, lack of judicial remedy does not mean no remedy
exists; although slow, electoral process is remedy). Once again, Justice Frankfurter is echoed: "In
a democratic society . .. , relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the
conscience of the people's representatives." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (how to select representatives is a non-justiciable political question).
206. Justice Scalia explained his view:
Where the courts, in the supposed interest of all the people, do enforce upon the executive branch
adherence to legislative policies that the political process itself would not enforce, they are likely
(despite the best of intentions) to be enforcing the political prejudices of their own class.
Scalia, supra note 145, at 896. But see Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 172, at 864-65 (if courts insist
on Congress's will, judicial review is democratic) and Poisner, supra note 4, at 374-78 (judicial review
increases agency ability to accurately aggregate preferences by making agencies more politically ac-
countable).
207. Scalia, supra note 167, at 107, arguing that judges should not decide levels of environmental
enforcement not because of any "unsuitability" to decide the issue but becausejudges are not politically
accountable.
208. Moreover, legislative initiatives can be lost in the halls of an executive agency within our
system. If Congress does not respond, then it is what the majority desired. Scalia, supra note 145, at
897. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2088-89
(1990) (giving agencies interpretive authority may allow changed circumstances to affect legislation
in manner similar to common law growth). But see Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution
of the Law?, 40 VANDERBILT L. REV. 389 (1987) (executive should not pick and choose laws but does
do so); Peter Lehner, supra note 204, at 690 (judges, not legislators, are traditional interpreters of past
laws).
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One barrier to court action is standing. It thus serves a separation of powers
agenda by limiting lawsuits to those with concrete, individt.alized harm. 20 9 Justice
Scalia has at least twice favorably quoted the following from a 1944 case:
When Congress passes an act empowering administrative age icies to carry on govern-
mental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed sy the authority granted.
This permits the courts to participate in law enforcement en:rusted to administrative
bodies only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against administrative action
fairly beyond the granted powers . . . (emphasis added by Justice Scalia).2"'
Viewed in this manner, separation of powers prevents the courts from second-
guessing generally applicable executive action. It is up to thle legislative branch to
insist that agencies comply with the intent of the laws it passes.
21 1
C. THE APA AND SEPARATION OF Pow ERS
National Wildlife Federation forwardsJustice Scalia's separition of powers agenda
in two ways. First, he insisted on a clear and unequivocal "injury in fact" that
would distinguish the plaintiffs and thus prove that judicigl intervention on their
behalf was justified. To Justice Scalia, this requires a showing that the plaintiffs
were "harmed more than the rest of us, . . . [thus establishing a] basis for concern
that the majority is suppressing or ignoring the rights of a minority that wants
protection. " 2 1 Second, he elevated the APA reference to 'an agency action" as
a precursor to judicial review into an overriding requiremcnt of particularity that
must be met before a court can intervene."' The APA does not necessarily require
this interpretation.
The APA defines "agency action" broadly. It includes 'the whole or a part of
an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof,
or failure to act. ,214 Each of these enumerated components of an "action" are
defined. For example, a "rule" is a wide category of activity: agency acts of
"general or particular applicability and future effect." 5 Because the definition
209. Cf, Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs am' Private Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 1193, 1271 (1982) (noting separation of powers arguments against private rights of action).
210. Scalia, supra note 145, at 883, quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944). Justice
Scalia quotes the same passage in Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2145. "tark upheld the right of dairy
producers to challenge administrator of the milk settlement fund despite the fact that the act did not
expressly provide for judicial review at their behest. The administrative act affected their payments
directly, giving rise to personal rights "not possessed by the people genendly." Stark, 321 U.S. at 309.
This is in contrast to the consumers that Scalia would deny had standing. Community Nutrition Institute,
698 F.2d at 1297 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. But, according to Justice Scalia, this insistence cannot be throug legislative vetoes. Antonin
Scalia, Oversight and Review of Agency Decisionmaking, 28 ADMIN. L. REv. 661, 684-95 (1976).
212. Scalia, supra note 145, at 894.
213. This tendency is related to some cases that deny standing to challcnge police practices because
of a lack of concrete injury. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Just ce Rehnquist refused to see
a connection between past individual rights violations and disciplinary pol cies of the police department
that arguably could influence an unnamed policeman to violate plaintiff;' rights again in the future.
Id. at 367-72.
214. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988) (emphasis added).
215. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
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of "action" quoted above includes within its scope "the equivalent" of each of
the enumerated components, an agency-sanctioned pattern of activity could be an
"agency action.""' If the pattern is designed to control future activities, it would
be the equivalent of a "rule."
Justice Scalia, however, seemingly requires specifically designated "orders" or
"rules" in order to dignify agency activity with the title "action. "217 Moreover,
in his ripeness analysis, when faced with what undoubtedly was an agency
"rule," 21 8 he apparently wanted an adjudicated decision on land use-an order
in APA terms219-before he would proceed. This precludes early and system-wide
relief.
What Justice Scalia did in National Wildlife Federation is akin to what Justice
Rehnquist did in Air Courier. Both restrict the universe of potential challengers to
agency action. The strict interpretation of the "zone-of-interest" test is related to
separation of powers because it insists on concrete, individual cases as the crux of
the judicial realm. Nevertheless, Air Courier deserves further explication.
V. "Bystander" Status Resurgent
A second major theme present in the cases is the philosophy that "bystanders"
generally should not have standing. This concept imbues National Wildlife Federation
and Defenders of Wildlife2 20 to a certain extent, but is even more important in Air
Courier. Close examination of congressional intent under a revitalized "zone-of-
interest" test will limit standing to those who are either the regulated or the primary
beneficiaries of a regulatory statute. Although not making those with standing
coterminous with those "especially benefitted" by a statute, as required for a
private cause of action, standing requirements have tightened.
A. THE "ZONE" TEST: OPENED AND CLOSED
Initial standing doctrine limited challenges of agency action to those who suf-
fered legal wrong or who would come within the meaning of the word "aggrieved"
216. Cf, Sunstein, supra note 195, at 678-79 (Heckler exception making "pattern" of non-
enforcement more reviewable than isolated refusal to act is because pattern equals an assessment of
congressional intent).
217. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3189. (Land Withdrawal Review Program "does not refer
to a single BLM order or regulation, or even to a completed universe of particular BLM orders and
regulations"). Justice Scalia also adamantly rejects judicially requiring the BLM to establish rules for
public participation or information dissemination when system-wide or general failures are alleged.
To Justice Scalia, any response to such an allegation would interfere with executive prerogatives:
"With regard to alleged deficiencies in providing information and permitting public participation, as
with regard to the other illegalities alleged in the complaint, respondent cannot demand a general
judicial review of the BLM's day-to-day operations." Id. at 3194.
218. A Public Land Order or PLO. Id. at 3140. See discussion in text, supra notes 68-69.
219. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1988).
220. It is most clear in the discussion of procedural injury, in which Justice Scalia maintains that
Congress could not imbue "any person" with the right to remedy the failure to follow statutory
procedures. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2144-46. Article III injury in fact requirements overrule
such wide grants.
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as specifically used in a particular statute.22 ' This tended to allow the regulated to
enter the courts, but many of the beneficiaries of statutes were denied standing
as mere "bystanders.- 222 Association of Data Processing Setvice Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp 223 interpreted the APA as enlarging the universe of potential plaintiffs;
"adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of [the] relevant stat-
ute" 224 meant those "arguably within the zone of interests" of the relevant
statute. 
225
The re-interpretation of the APA led to the liberally interpreted "zone-of-
interest" test,226 which could reverse prior holdings on who could enter the court-
house. 227 The test did not require proof that Congress hal intended to grant a
private right of action to the protesting parties. 221 Consequently, the "zone-of-
interest" test lowered the burden of proof for access to court. 229 Beneficiaries of
statutes need not be mere bystanders, but actually those intended by Congress to
enforce a statutory scheme. 2"0 Nevertheless, all three recent Supreme Court cases
make it harder for someone other than the directly regulated to enter a court. They
narrow the largesse of these precedents.
The first mechanism for restricting review occurred thiough Justice Scalia's
221. As then Judge Scalia phrased the pre-Data Processing view: "Quite evidently, one cannot be
'adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of [a] statute' that do :s not contain those-or at
least substantially similar-words." Scalia, supra note 145, at 887-88.
222. This was, of course, a tautology: if one was a "bystander" one w, )uld not have standing. See
Sunstein, supra note 151, at 1435, n.18.
223. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
224. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
225. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc., 397 U.S. at 156. As Judge Scalia put it,
"the wording of the APA was interpreted to mean no more than 'adversely affected or aggrieved in
a respect which the statute sought to prevent.' " Scalia, supra note 145, it 889.
226. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc., 397 U.S. at 156;'Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399.
227. The strength of the change is obvious from the "competitor" cases. Under the earlier private
rights view, a competitor could not object because there was no "legal interest" in being free from
competition. Tennessee Power, 306 U.S. at 137-38. By contrast, the Supre:ne Court later found that
competitors of a regulated entity could be proper parties to protest the activities of the regulating
agency if they show a "plausible relationship" to the underlying policies of the regulating act. Clarke,
479 U.S. at 403 (policy was to prevent ills that could accompany a monopoly'. See Henry P. Monaghan,
Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 311-312 (1984) (test authorized private attorneys general
because competitive impact was an interest regulators must recognize).
228. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400, n.16 (private causes of action, require .greater threshold burden,
namely showing plaintiff was "one of the class for whose especial benefit :he statute was enacted,"
citing, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). See also Japan Whaling Association, 478 U.S. 230-31 n.4.
(Blackmun, J.) (private right of action not needed for judicial review; A PA grants that right and
zone-of-interest test provides a different threshold). For further information :n private rights of action,
see Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 209, at 1289-1316.
229. See Scott, supra note 149, at 663 (word "arguably" before "within the zone of interest of the
statute" reduces clarity with which plaintiff must show Congress desired to protect; mere indication
that it knew of plaintiff's interest might suffice) and William A. Fletcher, Fhe Structure of Standing, 98
YALE L.J. 221, 234-35 (1988) (test resembles standard to determine if federzl claim exists; only denied
if wholly frivolous or insubstantial).
230. The "zone-of-interest" test so-interpreted is broader than acknowltdging situations where an
act actually directly creates rights and hence "injuries." See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 373 (1982)("[T]he actual or threatened injury required by Art. II] may exist solely by virtue
of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing . . .' ") (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975), quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 .S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)).
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insistence in National Wildlife Federation on strict "ripeness." Unless Congress
specifically provides for earlier review, a regulation cannot be judicially reviewed
until "concrete effects" are felt.2" 1 The directly regulated will not feel the brunt
of this as deeply as the purported beneficiaries of a regulation because of the
acknowledged exception to his ripeness requirement: review will be appropriate
when a substantive rule requires a plaintiff to immediately modify behavior.232
Obviously, it is the regulated who must modify behavior, not the beneficiary of
regulation.
The regulated will have quicker access to courts, but perhaps more importantly,
they also will always have standing. Justice Scalia has stated that one who is "the
very object of a law's requirement or prohibition" will always be able to show an
"individual" grievance. 23 The timing preference and assured standing will tilt
agency action away from vigorous enforcement of statutes as agencies seek to avoid
lawsuits from those who can challenge them. This defensive action may harm
beneficiaries. 234
Beneficiaries are further frustrated because standing is more problematic for
persons other than the regulated. Some injuries could be deemed fortuitous, in
the sense that the law was not designed to prevent that harm, but was designed
for another purpose. 233 Justice Scalia's hypothetical in National Wildlife Federation
would amount to such an example. 236 A requirement that hearings be held on the
record is to ensure due process for parties, not full employment for court reporters.
Most cases are not as clear-cut as this.
To address this problem, the "zone-of-interest" test was designed to look at the
relationship between the alleged harm and the statute's purposes. For ajudge who
views the public's ability to sue as a necessary "check" on the other branches of
government, broad relationships would suffice. 237 For a judge that contends that
231. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3190.
232. Id.
233. Scalia, supra note 145, at 894 (emphasis in original). This contrasts with what Justice Scalia
described as a "plaintiff. . . complaining of an agency's unlawful failure to impose a requirement or
prohibition upon someone else." Id. (emphasis in original). In the latter situation, unless some individual
harm distinguishes the plaintiff, Justice Scalia views the plaintiff as simply claiming that acts required
by law or the Constitution are being withheld. Id. This view was echoed in Defenders of Wildlife, 112
S. Ct. at 2137. Cf., Justice Rehnquist's rationale in Heckler v. Chaney against review of a decision to
not enforce an act: "[W]hen an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power
over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often
are called upon to protect." 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (emphasis in original).
234. Richard J. Pierce, The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1283-84 (1989) (agencies respond to arguments of those who can challenge-in
court, not to others) and Poisner, supra note 4, at 374-75 (unequal standing rights leads to unequal
bargaining power before agencies). Cf Note (Peter Lehner), supra note 204, at 643-44 (failure to review
non-implementation skews administrative law in favor of regulated).
235. Scalia, supra note 145, at 895.
236. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3186, quoted, supra text at note 122.
237. See, e.g., Justice White in Clarke: "Competitors who allege an injury that implicates the policies
of the National Bank Act are very reasonable candidates to seek review of the Comptroller's rulings.
There is sound reason to infer that Congress intended [this] class [of plaintiffs] to be relied upon to
challenge agency disregard of the law.' " Clarke, 479 U.S. 388, 399 quoting Community Nutrition Institute,
467 U.S. at 347. See Hutton, supra note 144, at 411-12, discussing Justice White's view of separation
of powers.
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courts do not entertain suits to rectify majoritarian comrlaints, a philosophical
quandary results if a statute has a very broad zone of interest.
B. AIR COURIER UNCLOAKED
Justice Scalia, while ajudge on the D.C. Circuit Cour of Appeals, identified
two types of statutes that could have broad spheres: statutes that seek to protect
nothing but "generalized interests" and ones that "benefit[] generalized interests
through the protection of more particularized interests to which it is immediately directed. ,,'11
Classifying a statue ascertains who would have standing under Justice Scalia's
view. This philosophy may have influenced the Air Courier decision.
239
For the first type of statute, which is concerned only with generalized interests,
Congress may have intended to give standing to everyone impacted.24 Justice
Scalia doubted, however, that Congress always would have meant to make other
large universes of persons "private attorneys general" simply because of their
concern with a statute's generalized benefits. Therefore, if the statute is of the
second type, so that there are direct and immediate bene:iciaries, these persons
and not the more generalized indirect beneficiaries would have standing. Even if
the indirect beneficiaries have interests within the disputed act's purposes, they
should rely on those through which their claims derive forj idicial enforcement.
241
These categorizations of types of beneficiaries and potential plaintiffs are not
new. In fact, Justice Scalia's arguments mirror those of Justice Frankfurter:
Frequently governmental action directly affects the legal inte .est of some person, and
causes only a consequential detriment to another. Whether thc consequentially harmed
can challenge the action is said to depend on the "directness" cf the impact of the action
on him .... [It is not true that only directly affected can sue. ] The likelihood that the
interests of the petitioner will be adequately protected by the I erson directly affected is
a relevant consideration . . . as is, probably, the nature of the relationship involved.24 2
Current conservative views on standing and justiciability aain reflect a prior era.
238. Community Nutrition Institute, 698 F.2d at 1257. (Scalia, J., disser ting) (emphasis in original)
He explains why the situation is likely to occur: "Almost any statute has l;eneralized indirect benefits;
ultimate improvement of the society at large is the whole theoretical justification for heeding the
requests of special interests.' " Id.
239. Compare then-Judge Scalia's complaint that the D.C. Circuit was collapsing the zone-of-interest
test into the injury in fact determination, Securities Industries Association v. Comptroller of the
Currency, 765 F. 2d 1196 (1985) (dissenting from denial of rehearing), aff'o sub nom. Clarke v. Securities
Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388 (1987) with Justice Rehnquist's obj..ction to "conflat [-ing] the
zone-of-interests test with injury in fact." Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 918. Fo:" other comparisons between
Justice Rehnquist and earlier Scalia opinions, see notes 140-141, supra.
240. Community Nutrition Institute, 698 F.2d at 1257. (Scalia, J., dissent ng). NEPA and its environ-
mental concerns are cited as an example.
241. Id. The zone-of-interest test is ultimately a way of apprising Congress's intent as to who it
anticipated would enforce the statute. See also Scalia, supra note 145, at 896 (courts should not presume
Congress designated a "minority group broad enough to include the entire population").
242. Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at 153-54 (Frankfurter, J. i. Ironically, Professor Scott
identified this case as one in which only those secondarily impacted were allowed standing. The
organizations listed as subversive used their own injuries to receive star ding, but the more directly
impacted parties were the government employees who were told they coul not join the organizations.
Scott, supra note 149, at 679-80.
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It was not, however, until the Air Courier decision that the Supreme Court
re-adopted these thoughts. Justice Scalia had adopted this position when he praised
an earlier case, Stark v. Wickard."4 ' In Stark, milk handlers would not be interested
in administration of the settlement fund, the issue in the case. Hence, producer
claims could not be protected "derivatively" by the handlers, who had express
rights tojudicial review. Producers, therefore, had standing.144 In Community Nutri-
tion Institute,245 then Judge Scalia attempted to use the same rationale to deny
standing for milk consumers.
The claims of consumers of milk to Judge Scalia were derived from interests of
both the producers and the milk handlers. Standing for them therefore would be
inappropriate. Consumer interest in a high-enough price to ensure a sufficient
supply would be protected by the producers, and the milk handlers would protect
consumer interest in avoiding artificially high prices. 2 6 Although superficially
correct, if milk has inelastic demand, which for some portions of the population
is or should be true, then the milk handlers have no incentive to sue because they
could pass on the price they pay even if too high. When this question was before
the Supreme Court, whether or not the handlers would pass on savings they
received from appealing was deemed irrelevant.247 This conclusion undercuts Jus-
tice Scalia's derivative protection analysis. In fact, the Supreme Court did not
adopt his view at this point, but based its decision on the statutory scheme preclud-
ing additional remedies.
2 48
The distinction between indirect or consequential beneficiaries and immediate
beneficiaries, however, might answer the question of who could have standing in
Air Courier. Perhaps patrons of a rural post office scheduled to close for lack of
revenue or a domestic mailer whose rates are being raised might be able to object.
These parties might be called the immediate and direct beneficiaries of the act
if one views the postal monopoly as attempting to provide universal service at
reasonable rates.24 9 These plaintiffs, however, might encounter difficulties with
the "fairly traceable" and "likely to be redressed" hurdles. A competitor of a
person using the exemption could object to the grant of the exemption under
earlier precedents, but perhaps not now. 250 Liberal precedents have been modified.
In Air Courier, the court directly looked at the "zone-of-interest" test and read
the statute narrowly. Moreover, at no time in the opinion did the court use
the terminology "arguably within the zone of interest. ,251 Citing National Wildlife
243. Scalia, supra note 145, at 883, discussed supra note 164.
244. 321 U.S. at 308.
245. 698 F.2d at 1257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. Id.
247. 467 U.S. at 352 n.3.
248. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. at 347.
249. See Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 920.
250. Justice Scalia, as a judge on the D.C. Circuit, objected to grants of competitor standing.
Securities Industry Association, 758 F.2d at 740 and 765 F.2d at 1197 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251. This terminology should have been used in the APA arena. Community Nutrition Institute, 698
F.2d at 1256. (Scalia, J., dissenting). ("zone-of-interest" test developed for APA review with word
"arguably;" also used as prudential limitation in non-APA setting and Supreme Court dropped
"arguably" only there).
WINTER 1993
45 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 65
Federation, it formulated the test to require the unions to "show that they are within
the zone of interests sought to be protected through the PES."252 The "arguable"
language apparently was designed to lower the test's threshold.255 This linguistic
change is significant: by removing "arguable," the zor.e test merges with the
private right of action cases. Only direct beneficiaries will 'e able to meet the test.
Analyzing a statute to discover direct beneficiaries reflects general concerns
about judicial interference with the executive at the behe st of those with broad-
based interests. It explains the Supreme Court's attempt to put teeth in the pre-
viously tame "zone-of-interest" test.254 The discussion in Defenders of Wildlife of
the meaning of a citizen's suit provision serves a complementary purpose. Con-
gress may not confer standing on a party who was not inju ced with particularity:
"Individual rights ...[the vindication of which is the jt dicial function] do not
mean public rights that have been legislatively pronourced to belong to each
individual who forms a part of the public." 255 Strict injury in fact and zone-of-
interest tests limit those who may seek conformity with c~ngressional demands.
VI. Further Trends: Sovereign Immunity alad The "New"
Nondelegation
A. STANDING AS SURROGATE FOR SOVEREIGN [MMUNITY
Strict standing and ripeness analysis also may mark a r -surgence of sovereign
immunity in the guise of standing.256 In an early article, Justice Scalia praised an
opinion by Justice Brandeis that seemingly limited sovereign immunity claims to
arguments against legislative action and delegated protection of the executive to
two doctrines: standing and the ministerial-discretionar) dichotomy. 27 Use of
standing in this manner would insulate the agency from udicial review.
258
Relating sovereign immunity to standing would begin with a presumption
against review. Nevertheless, on a superficial level, Justice Scalia's refusal to allow
standing in National Wildlife Federation could seem ironic in light of his earlier
252. Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 917 (emphasis added), citingNational Wila life F d'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3177.
See also Air Courier, 111 S. Ct. at 918: "Specifically, 'the plaintiff must estE blish that the injury he com-
plains of(his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the "zo se of interests" sought to be
protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis ol his complaint.' "(quoting,
National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3186) (emphasis in original).
253. Fletcher, supra note 229, at 263-64 ("arguably" means presume sianding, not that one should
make a tentative decision on whether plaintiff is entitled to sue).
254. Therefore, it might signal a change in another of the prudential limitations on standing,
namely, the inability to champion the rights of third-parties. Cf, the z )ne test and its underlying
justifications of concern for immediacy and individual harm. The Court characterized the PES as a
"competition statute that regulates the conduct of competitors of the Post d Service. " Air Courier, 111
S. Ct. at 920 n.5. Therefore, it could rely on other cases denying employees standing to enforce
competition laws "because they lack competitive and direct injury." Id.
255. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2145.
256. Scalia, supra note 150, at 904-5 (standing can do the work of soereign immunity).
257. Id. at 903-07, discussing Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (192i).
258. Compare Fallon, supra note 43, at 24-30 (standing analysis displaci:sg more flexible doctrine of
mootness in federal litigation predicated on past injuries).
The "New" Old Law of Judicial Access 101
writings. National Wildlife Federation involved a challenge to actions of the Depart-
ment of Interior. Justice Scalia's article noted that sovereign immunity was almost
never raised as a defense to such suits.25 9 Looking closer, however, there is consis-
tency. The cases allowing review of Interior decisions cited by Justice Scalia
involved individuals claiming that they were denied specific resources.26 The
National Wildlife Federation plaintiffs, of course, were not developers but preservers
and raised issues of general concern rather than individual rights. Therefore,
standing as a substitute for sovereign immunity would reflect the private rights
model of standing.
B. THE "NEW" NONDELEGATION
In addition to providing echoes of sovereign immunity, restrictingjudicial access
may, in a roundabout manner, be forwarding the nondelegation doctrine. The
nondelegation doctrine insists that Congress cannot delegate legislative authority
and must confine administrative action by relatively precise standards. 261 No stat-
ute has been invalidated on the theory since 1935.262 The doctrine has, however,
garnered some recent express support. 263 More importantly, the doctrine's aims
are underscored by the Supreme Court's standing and ripeness cases and other
developments.
Denying judicial review will force Congress's hand. 26 4 It will be required to
legislate with specificity because if it speaks in generalities, the judiciary will not
constrain an agency and force it to comply with underlying policy goals. In a
seeming contradiction, by a court allowing too much agency discretion through
approving too much delegated authority, the desired end of the nondelegation
doctrine may be met. Restricted standing and ripeness rules play a role in this
resurgence of an old doctrine.
If no review may be had of a general agency program, Congress will be
forced to act if it is displeased with agency performance. Congress may act
259. Scalia, supra note 150, at 917-18.
260. See, e.g., id. at 875-82, citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
261. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 209, at 1260-61 (doctrine promotes political accountability
and predictability for those benefitted or regulated).
262. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
263. American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) and Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448
U.S. 607, 672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring.) For the pros and cons of reinstituting the doctrine,
see generally, Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, Part I, 36 AMER.
U. L. REV. 295-492 (1987). For criticisms, see, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law andEconom-
ics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 366-67 (1988) (judicial review should mandate
internal and budgetary consistency to interpret statute); Richard J. Pierce, The Role of Constitutional
and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REV. 469, 489-502 (1985) (reinvigorating doctrine
appealing in abstract but impractical); and RichardJ. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and judicial
Review ofAgency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1175, 1205 (1981) (if reinstate and refuse to allow generalities,
Congress would pass less regulatory law).
264. Cf, Murchison, supra note 18, at 173 (ripeness forces Congress's hand). Kevin W. Saunders,
Agency Interpretations and Judicial Review: A Search for Limits On the Controlling Effect Given Agency Construc-
tions, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 769, 796-98 (1988) (doctrine could apply to whether agency construction can
have controlling weight on judicial review).
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directly against the agency by restricting an agency', budget. To remove
judicially created ripeness barriers, it may authorize coarts to review specific
regulations immediately upon promulgation.265 Restrants on standing and
ripeness may require more congressional action, but ther Supreme Court
pronouncements about the relationship between the courts and agencies also
could result in more specificity from Congress. No law need be formally
invalidated under the nondelegation doctrine for a parallMl result to occur under
this mirror-image nondelegation doctrine.
Congress's ability to legislate is further challenged because the Chevron
2 66
doctrine also insulates agencies from judicial interferenc. . Chevron's role in the
new nondelgation doctrine is peculiar to the point of t eing perverse because
it implicitly rejects the argument that Congress cannot delegate resolution of
policies to other branches. The Court in Chevron recognized that the policy at
issue originated in the White House and therefore confirmed the President's
power to control agencies and make policy choices.2 6 7 Nevertheless, under
Chevron, if Congress has not clearly spoken on a matter, and has either explicitly
or implicitly granted the agency authority to regulate, the role of a court is
limited: "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency. ,268
This helps erode judicial review. 269
The doctrine goes beyond mere deference to an agency. Deference implies the
possibility of disagreement, but Chevron gives legislative effi:ct to agency interpreta-
270tions. Consequently, courts are not actively reviewing ag~ency interpretations of
265. See Justice Scalia's point that early intervention is only allowed vhen congressionally author-
ized. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. at 3190.
266. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See
generally, Sunstein, supra note 195, at 675 (1990) (Chevron altered the distribution of national powers
among the courts, Congress, and administrative agencies). But see Scalia, supra note 168, at 517 (not
necessarily new law but simply provides a background rule giving agercies the primary interpretive
role unless Congress designates differently).
267. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. See also Pierce, supra note 263, at 50i.
268. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Conversely, if Congress has clearly tpoken, both the agency and
Court are bound; "[they] must give effect to the unambiguously expr.ssed intent of Congress."
Id. at 842-43.
269. The retreat fromjudicial review is further illustrated by Hecklert. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)
(no review of FDA decision to not take enforcement action against us of lethal drugs from capital
punishment). At least in the case of agency inaction, Heckler demands that courts operate from the
presumption that review is not available. 470 U.S. at 834-35.
270. Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An, [nalysis And a Proposalfor Public
Participation, 1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 357 (expands agency rules receiving 1 :gislative effect from those for
which explicit delegation of rulemaking exists to include ones promulgated under implicit authority).
Although some question whether the doctrine should apply to questions of "pure" statutory construc-
tion, Justice Scalia maintains it should. Scalia, supra note 168, at 512. For defenses of such deference,
see Michael Asimow, Non-Legislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 414-15
(avoids challenges without persuasive arguments); Pierce, supra note 263, at 520-25 (presidential
control is sufficient political accountability) and Scalia, supra note 168, at 517-18 (doctrine's strength
is it allows law to change in light of changed circumstances). For more tcmpered defenses, see Shapiro
& Glicksman, supra note 172, at 869 (if require more complex inquir., into clarity of congressional
intent, doctrine not necessarily bad) and Sunstein, supra note 208, it 2076 (doctrine is plausible
reconstruction of Congress's desires and role of agencies if appropriately limited).
The "New" Old Law of Judicial Access 103
the statutes they administer. 271 A court may not substitute its view of a statute's
meaning for that of the agency if the statute interpreted was ambiguous."
More and more, almost all statutes are found to have ambiguity of some de-
gree.2 73 This increases reliance on agency interpretation.2 7 4 Because the courts
must compel an agency to implement what Congress has clearly stated,275 Congress
will have to authorize both actions and priorities explicitly and cease granting
agencies policy discretion276 and execution discretion.277 To do so will be difficult.278
Nevertheless, if Congress does not act with greater specificity, it risks having its
proposals misinterpreted.
The Supreme Court has modified not only judicial roles, but also those of
Congress through its cases delineating judicial review of agency action. Chevron
removes courts from active policing of agency compliance with less than specific
congressional intent. Standing and ripeness decisions reflect the conservative
Court's concern with the role of the judiciary and seek to limit it to protecting
individual rights that might be trammelled by agency action. They limit use of the
courts to seek general agency compliance with the will of Congress. In sum, the
executive branch is strengthened and the other branches weakened.279
271. Although Chevron dealt with rules promulgated after notice and comment, courts cite it as
precedent for the view that even informal agency pronouncements are binding unless arbitrary or
capricious. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (letter threatening enforcement
action without the need for a pre-cancellation hearing). Justice Scalia maintains it should apply to
agency determinations made in the ordinary course of business, but not to litigation positions. Scalia,
supra note 168, at 519-20.
272. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 843 ("question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute"). Justice Scalia explains the case as informing
Congress of who would resolve ambiguity so that it could accept or modify the roles. Scalia, supra note
168, at 517.
273. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 172, at 859 (presumption of ambiguity) and Saunders, supra
note 264, at 778-83 (final erosion ofjudicial review comes from ease with which courts find ambiguity).
But see Scalia, supra note 168, at 515 (finding ambiguity requires court to compare competing interpreta-
tions "only when the court concludes that the policy furthered by neither interpretation will be clearly
'better' (in the sense of achieving what Congress apparently wished it to achieve).") and Sunstein,
supra note 208, at 2091-92 (mere fact another plausible interpretation exists will not be sufficient
ambiguity).
274. Explained by Professor Strauss as a tendency by the Supreme Court to manage its case load
by relying on agencies that not only have "specialist" expertise, but have national scope and thus can
rein in disparate Circuit Courts. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fify Cases Per Year: Some Implications
of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 CoLUMBIA L. REv. 1093,
1114-22, 1126 (1987).
275. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.") See also Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
276. Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469, 483-84 (1986)
(power to take action to forward societal goals).
277. Id. at 479. (power to fill in details from vague, general or incomplete statutes).
278. Strauss, supra note 274, at 1116 (unrealistic to think Congress can correlate all aspects of legal
order). Professors Shapiro and Glicksman, however, argue that to a certain extent Congress has already
begun to legislate more specifically. Shapiro & Glicksman, supra note 172, at 820 (primarily spurred
by congressional displeasure with Reagan appointees, not the Supreme Court).
279. Cf., Justice Blackmun's argument that courts should enforce procedural duties: "[T]heprinci-
pal effect of foreclosing judicial enforcement of such procedures is to transfer power into the hands
of the Executive at the expense-not of the courts-but of Congress, from which that power originates
and emanates." Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2158 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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VII. Conclusion
The lower courts have not rushed to deny standing Iramatically because of
National Wildlife Federation and Air Courier."28 There is, how,;ver, a sense in the lower
courts that they must tread carefully because a signal has been sent: environmental
cases may no longer have a relaxed standing threshold. 2 ' Recent Supreme Court
decisions have aggressively continued the trend of restricting access to the courts
for parties complaining of agency action but who are not directly regulated by the
agency. One reason for this is that strictly interpreting standing and ripeness
doctrines is fundamental to the more general conservatixe agenda. It reflects not
only the current majority's belief in the limited role of the judiciary, but also
signals a resurgence in respect for agency decisionmaking when Congress fails to
make clear-cut policy choices.
The result of these changes is to cement the private rights model ofjudicial access
more definitely. The courts would not be involved in public value determinations,
which is not necessarily an objectionable result.282 However, congressional value
determinations may be lost if beneficiaries of programs a,'e unable to seek judicial
review at the threshold level of standing. Courts will not ,wven be able to ascertain
whether an agency is clearly violating statutes rather than making a delegated
policy choice.
In a government that has never had static relations between the branches;
283
the pendulum has swung toward the executive. By limiting access to courts, in
conjunction with demanding judicial deference to agency interpretations, the Su-
preme Court has removed an important "check and balance" on the executive
and also threatened congressional prerogatives. In so doing, the Court first deni-
grates an important judicial function, namely that of telling what the law is, in
favor of limiting the judicial role to protection of individur I rights. Judicial review,
however, is a necessary component of the checks and alances of our system.
Congress cannot micro-manage every agency. The political process is also an
inadequate control. People voting for the executive branch merely vote for a
President, and such vote cannot reflect either approval or cisapproval of the myriad
of decisions agencies have or will make in a four-year trm.
Restricted judicial access and restricted judicial revie", therefore, enfeeble not
only the judiciary, but weaken Congress. Its voice may be lost unless Congress
280. Mansfield, supra note 6, at 54-62.
281. See, e.g., Public Interest Research Group of NewJersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913
F.2d 64, 84 (3d Cir. 1990) (AldisertiJ., concurring) ("I am quick to r.tcognize that Lujan [v. National
Wildlife Fed'n] is not precise precedential authority, but it does neverthiless constitute a direction that
the Court desires us to travel in environmental law cases. "). For the arg iment that the Supreme Court
previously allowed a relatively slight showing to suffice for standing, s e Perino, supra note 8, at 144.
282. Actual factual allocations of limited resources, which require valuejudgments, should be made
by either Congress or the agency because they can best balance competing interests over a wide
spectrum. Courts are limited by both lack of expertise and the scope cf the controversy before it. See
Maria E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons from Public Land Law, 18 EcOL. L.Q. 43,
91 (1991).
283. Strauss, supra note 178, at 604 (continual flex, growth and ccmpetition between branches).
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reasserts its priority in policymaking. 284 The "new" nondelegation doctrine,
which is a mirror-image of the old, makes broad delegations of power to agencies
ineffectual because the courts will not restrain agencies to paths that would conform
with generalized congressional intent. Rather than directly invalidating statutes,
the new version simply allows frustration of congressional intent if Congress cannot
clearly express its views.
284. As an alternative to specific substantive guidelines, Justice Kennedy suggests Congress could
preserve judicial review by defining injuries and explicating chains of causation when it legislates in
a setting of complex relationships. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2146-49 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
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